



**ISFED**

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR  
FAIR ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

# 2021 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING FINAL REPORT

## ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN SOCIAL MEDIA



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The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy social media monitoring program is implemented with the support of the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (IFA) of the Federal Foreign Office of the Federative Republic of Germany, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The views expressed in the report are those of ISFED and do not necessarily reflect opinions of the donors.

Note: The names of the individual Facebook pages presented in the report and the posts published by them contain obscene language. Any such material is presented for illustrative purposes only. ISFED explicitly distances itself from the spirit of these pages and the content of their posts.

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## Introduction

In parallel with the transformation of social media into one of the main sources of information, in recent years, one of the main challenges of the elections has been the manipulation of voters by harmful actors using various strategies and tactics. From 2018, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, via open source data, seeks to identify coordinated information campaigns, expose manipulative tactics and strategies, increase disinformation resilience by informing voters and notifying the most popular social media platform in Georgia – Facebook about key findings.

In parallel with the identification of anonymous and manipulative information in the 2021 municipal elections, following in the footsteps of the election process, ISFED monitored election subjects – activity of political parties and candidates on social media, illegal agitation by public officials, official Facebook pages of local self-government bodies, and the posting of political advertisements. From the start of the election campaign until the second round of elections, from August 2 to November 6, the organization issued five interim reports on monitoring findings. This document is a summary report regarding the October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2021 municipal elections, presenting main trends and findings identified by ISFED during the election period on social media on election campaigns.

Facebook's library of political advertisements has been operating in Georgia since August 2020. According to the Facebook standard, all political and election advertisements are subject to declaration. The enactment of this standard to some extent has hindered anonymous actors from freely distributing anonymous political advertisements; however, in parallel with the platform's changed policies and strict standards, they often use false declarations, change information manipulation tactics, and thus try to conquer the information space of voters.

In parallel with the official campaign of Election Subjects on the most active social media platform in Georgia- Facebook and other less popular platforms, discrediting messages were still actively spread via mostly anonymous actors. The targets of the discrediting campaigns, along with the current political processes and election subjects, were also media outlets and non-governmental organizations.

ISFED observers scrutinized 7,922 posts published on Facebook using the monitoring program for the 2021 local government elections. Pages Revealed by ISFED and descriptions of their activities are available on the interactive website – [www.disinfoobserver.ge](http://www.disinfoobserver.ge).



## Key Findings

Some of the main sources of information for the 2021 municipal elections were the social media platforms - Facebook, TikTok, Telegram and Instagram. Facebook was popular with both political parties and candidates, as well as political interest groups, who often acted anonymously, although their activities were aimed at influencing the mood and behavior of voters.

Duplication of the unofficial discrediting and / or supportive campaign from Facebook to TikTok was noticeable as well. With tailored content to the TikTok platform, channels were actively using open defamatory, false media, and supportive tactics.

### Official campaign

Between August 2 and November 6, 30 of the 48 political unions running in the elections used Facebook pages. During the given period, the most active page belonged to the party "For Georgia". It was followed by the amount of posts published on the main page of "Lelo". The ruling party "Georgian Dream" was in third place in terms of the number of posts published on its main Facebook page, although it was ahead of all other political parties in terms of user interaction.

Some of the political parties, in addition to the official Facebook pages, also campaigned on local, region-specific or municipality-oriented pages. Among them, the pages of the Tbilisi regional organizations of the ruling party were distinguished by user interaction. The highest interaction among UNM local Facebook pages were seen on the pages of Adjara and Tsalenjikha organizations. The party "For Georgia" achieved the highest interaction rate on the pages for self-governing cities.

Among the candidates registered for the local self-government elections, the Facebook pages of 243 candidates were active during the period from the official start of the pre-election campaign to the October 2 polling day. Among them are 11 Tbilisi, 16 other self-governing city, 131 self-governing community mayoral and 85 city council candidate pages.

Among the Tbilisi mayoral candidates, 5 candidates were distinguished by their activity on Facebook and the rate of user interaction. The most active among them was Ana Dolidze. The official Facebook page of the ruling party candidate, Kakha Kaladze, published fewer posts than the pages of Dolidze, Melia and Gakharia, although his Facebook page was ahead by the total number of reactions, comments and shares compared to all other candidates' posts. A similar trend was noticed on the second round of elections. It should be noted that according to the number of interactions on Facebook, the sequence of the 5 leading Tbilisi mayoral coincides with their results in the first round of the Tbilisi mayoral elections.

Some political parties and candidates also used Instagram accounts for campaigning. Among them, the most active and responsive party was "Girchi - More Freedom". Kakha Kaladze stood out from the Tbilisi mayoral candidates with overall user interaction on his Instagram account, while the most amount of posts was published on Ana Dolidze's account.


The official campaign was launched on other social media platforms as well. Among the political parties, the Batumi organizations of "Girchi - More Freedom", "Girchi", "Droa", "Georgian Dream", "Labor Party", "Lelo" and "For Georgia" were active on TikTok. Tbilisi mayoral candidates Kakha Kaladze and Ana Dolidze also posted videos on the platform. Telegram was used to communicate with voters by "Girchi", "Free Georgia" and Tbilisi mayoral candidate Nika Melia.

Involvement of public officials and local self-government bodies in the digital election campaign

During the official pre-election campaign of the first and second rounds of the municipal elections, 662 cases of agitation material publications were noticed on the Facebook walls of 110 public officials during working hours. Most of them expressed their support for the ruling party and were directed against opposition parties, mainly the United National Movement and For Georgia. Agitation materials in favor of the United National Movement were published only by public officials employed in Dmanisi municipality. There was no party election agitation on the official Facebook pages of the local self-governments, although the active dissemination of materials reflecting the activities of the incumbent mayors and council members, who were also candidates, put them in an advantageous position. During the monitoring period, it was revealed that the Facebook page of the Zugdidi Municipality Sakrebulo was related to the Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti regional Facebook page of the ruling party, Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia.

Unofficial campaign

For the 2021 election, like the last parliamentary and presidential elections, organized defamatory campaigns on social media were largely anonymous. Posts published on these types of pages aimed to discredit opponents, non-governmental organizations, media outlets or the current election-political process. The scale and content of the unofficial political / election campaign may be a reflection of the high degree of polarization in the political field or a factor that may deepen the process. The number of posts published on the pages discrediting Georgian Dream were almost twice as many as the number of posts published on anti-opposition pages, although user reactions, comments and shares were 4 times more than the number of posts published on the pages operating against ruling party.



Source: Fact-a-lyzer

A total of 4,291 posts were published by the 35 pages acting against the ruling party, while the interaction (reaction, comment, share) on the posts totaled 286,754. Along with the discrediting posts of the Georgian Dream, supporting / positive messages were published in favor of the United National Movement. 40 pages targeting opposition were active on Facebook during the election period. 2,406 posts were published on the pages with a total of 1,250,497 interactions. 479 posts were sponsored by anonymous anti-opposition pages, for which a total of 6 375 USD was spent.

The targets of defamation were the leaders of political parties, both from the ruling party and the opposition. The attacks were personalized and aimed to humiliate, abuse and demean opponents in the eyes of social media users. Homophobic and sexist posts were also published to insult opponents.

One of the main tasks of the coordinated pages during the election period was to discredit the media outlets that are critical of the government, Mtavari TV, Formula, TV Pirveli and Kavkasia. Posts were actively published towards media managers and individual journalists. Part of the posts were aimed at portraying the media as force fighting against the Orthodox Church. Posts were sponsored where the ruling party was portrayed as a national, allied force of the Church, while the opposition and affiliated media outlets were portrayed as enemies of the Church. Posts that mocked journalists often involved mistakes that they made while speaking on various programs. And irregular behavior by female correspondents in their journalistic activities was also presented in a negative context.

A relatively small number of posts were also published against the pro-government media outlets, Imedi and PosTV. Their biased coverage of events in favor of the ruling party was emphasized. Some of the posts portrayed Imedi as a pro-Russian TV channel.

In addition to the media, anti-opposition pages also actively attacked observer organizations during the election period. One of the main targets of the coordinated pages was ISFED. Along with the coordinated behavior, there was the use of non-authentic accounts, through which the people behind the pages tried to increase the interaction of the posts and distribute them to groups with multiple followers.

The activity of Facebook pages using false media tactics was still noticeable. It is worth noting that similar pages were activated for the municipal elections on a local level. During the election period, 1,010 posts were published on 21 false media pages. The total number of interactions reached 168,742. According to ISFED, 208 posts were sponsored on the false media pages. These pages are part of a network of defamatory pages who try to gain informatory advantage over users by camouflaging as online media.

False support was another disguised tactic that was used for defamation, which was less widespread compared to the recent presidential and parliamentary elections. In order to discredit the United National Movement in the local self-government elections, a page named - "2 ოქტომბერს მიშა საქართველოში/October 2 Misha in Georgia · mishasakartveloshi", was created, which presented itself as a supporter of Mikheil Saakashvili. A total of 47 posts were published on the page, with a total of 29,603 interactions. 24 posts, which is half of the posts published on the platform, were sponsored.


### Supporting Facebook pages

There are also pages on Facebook, the main purpose of which is to express support for their desired political entity and gain the goodwill of users. Recently, there has been an increase in discrediting posts published on supporting pages, which has been less common in the past for these type of organized pages.

30 pages worked in favor of the Georgian Dream and the government, 40 pages acted in support of a part of the opposition, 30 of which supported the United National Movement and/or Mikheil Saakashvili, 4 pages supported "For Georgia" and the rest supported Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Alliance of Patriots of Georgia,

For the People and Aleko Elisashvili – Citizens. At the beginning of the reporting period, one page - "Georgia's European Future" published posts in support of the Georgian Labour Party and later for Mikheil Saakashvili.

The number of posts published on the support pages of the opposition parties is almost twice as high as the number of posts published on the support pages of the ruling party, however, user interaction to Georgian Dream support posts is much higher compared to the support pages of the opposition parties.



Source: Fact-a-Iyzer



## I. Official social media campaign


### 1.1 Political party activity on Facebook

For the 2021 local self-government elections, political parties were actively using Facebook for campaigning. From the start of the official election campaign, from August 2 to November 6, 30 political parties running in the municipal elections were active on Facebook. Among them, 15 political parties used more than one page. In addition to the pages of major national, women, and youth organizations/associations, the posts were also published on the local Facebook pages of political associations. During the reporting period, the United National Movement had the most organizational pages on Facebook. The party "For Georgia" was distinguished by the frequency of publishing posts. "Georgian Dream" was the leader in the number of total user interactions on published posts.

**Activity and interaction of the official organizational Facebook pages of political parties - the first 5 parties by number of active pages.** (August 2 - November 6, 2021; Source: CrowdTangle).


Political Party	Number of Active Pages	Number of Posts	Average Interaction per Post	Total Interaction
UNM	96	5,237	105	
Georgian Dream	69	4,183	306	
For Georgia	63	6,127	51	
Strategy Agmashenebeli	35	1,717	25	

Political parties ran a common national election campaign on their main official Facebook pages. From August 2 to November 6, the main page of For Georgia party was the most active page on Facebook. It was followed by the number of posts published on Lelo's main Facebook page. In terms of activity, the main page of the Georgian Dream is in third place, although the number of user interactions in the published posts has significantly exceeded the interaction on pages of other political parties.



Source: CrowdTangle


**Interaction on the main Facebook pages of political parties**  
(2 August - 6 November, 2021)




Source: CrowdTangle

Before the end of the first round of elections, among the 20 most active local Facebook pages included, 7- For Georgia, 5- Georgian Dream, 3- United National Movement and 2- European Georgia Facebook pages. Lelo, Girchi - More Freedom and Third Force –Strategy Aghmashenebeli had only one local organizational Facebook page for each party. The pages of the Tbilisi regional organizations of the ruling party were distinguished by user interaction. The highest interaction among UNM local Facebook pages was noticed on the pages of Adjara and Tsalenjikha organizations. The party For Georgia reached the highest interaction on the pages for self-governing cities.


**Number of posts on local political party Facebook pages**  
(2 August - 2 October, 2021)



Source: CrowdTangle




Among the Facebook pages of the local organizations of political parties whose representatives participated in the second round of voting, the UNM pages were ahead of the local organizational pages of the Georgian Dream in terms of activity. Among them, the posts were most often published by the Samtredia page of the party. The number of user interaction reached its maximum on the Facebook page of the UNM Adjara organization. Among the local organizational Facebook pages of the Georgian Dream, the Adjara page of the party was characterized by the highest level of activity and interaction.



*Source: CrowdTangle*

**Number of posts published on the Facebook pages of local Georgian Dream organizations**


(3 October - 6 November, 2021)



Source: CrowdTangle

**Interaction of Facebook pages of local organizations of political parties participating in the second round**

(3 October - 6 November 2021)




Source: CrowdTangle



## 1.2 Candidate activity on Facebook


ISFED monitored the Facebook activity of Municipality mayoral and Tbilisi City Council candidates (Majoritarian MP candidates and the top ten of the party list). According to the organization, 243 candidate pages were active among the candidates registered for the local self-government elections in the period from the official start of the pre-election campaign to the voting day on October 2. Among them are 11 Tbilisi, 16 self-governing city, 131 self-governing community mayoral and 85 Tbilisi Sakrebulo candidate pages.

Ana Dolidze had the highest activity among the Tbilisi mayoral candidates in the pre-election period of the first round. She used videos and live broadcasts to show Facebook users her activities and her position. The most posts in the form of photos were published on the Facebook page of the leader of the United National Movement, Nika Melia.



*Source: CrowdTangle*

Although the number of posts published by Kakha Kaladze, the mayoral candidate of the Georgian Dream, was lower than the activity of the other three candidates, his Facebook page was ahead of the total number of reactions, comments and shares on the posts published on all other candidates' pages. It should be noted that according to the number of interactions on Facebook, the sequence of 5 leading candidates coincides with their place in the results of the first round of Tbilisi mayoral elections.




*Source: CrowdTangle*

After the first round of the elections, among the candidates running in the second round of the capital's mayoral elections, Nika Melia published more frequent posts on Facebook, although he was behind the rival candidate from the Georgian Dream in terms of user interaction. One post published on Kaladze's Facebook page on average received, 2.6 times more interactions than a post on Melia's page.


**Activity and interaction of Tbilisi mayoral candidates participating in the second round on Facebook after the first round of elections** (Source: CrowdTangle; October 3 - November 6, 2021).

Candidate page	Number of posts	Total Interaction	Average interaction
Nika Melia / ნიკა მელია	137	692,479	5,055
Kakha Kaladze/ კახა კალაძე	57	746,071	13,089

Among the 24 mayoral candidates from other self-governing cities, only 16 candidates had an active official page on Facebook. Among them, representatives of three political parties stood out with their significant level of activity and user interaction (United National Movement, Georgian Dream, For Georgia). From the official start of the election campaign until the end of the voting on October 2, more posts were published on Facebook in Kutaisi and Batumi by the Georgian Dream, and in Rustavi and Poti by UNM candidates. Between October 3 and November 6, in all four self-governing cities, UNM candidates were characterized by higher levels of Facebook activity. In Kutaisi, Rustavi and Poti, the number of user interactions on the posts published on the pages of UNM mayoral candidates exceeded the corresponding figure on the pages of the ruling party's candidates. Between the Batumi mayoral candidates the number of total interactions exceeded in favor of the ruling party's candidate page.




Source: CrowdTangle




*Source: CrowdTangle*

Among the Tbilisi Sakrebulo candidates, the election subjects nominating the most active candidates on Facebook were more diverse than the composition of the nominating entities with the highest interaction. Most of the posts were published on the Facebook page of Revaz Sokhadze, the candidate of the Georgian Dream in the Samgori local majoritarian constituency. Based on user interaction the first place was taken by the independent candidate of Saburtalo district, Vato Shakarishvili, the reason for which was also due to the high frequency of advertising on the platform. Representatives of the citizens' political unions - "Labor Party", "Droa", "Tribuna", "Georgian Dream" and "Lelo" took the next places in the top ten.



*Source: CrowdTangle*

**Interaction of Tbilisi Sakrebulo candidates' Facebook pages  
(2 August - 2 October, 2021)**




Source: CrowdTangle

According to ISFED, from August 2 to October 2, 80% of the active Facebook pages of 131 mayoral candidates in self-governing communities belonged to representatives of the Georgian Dream and the United National Movement. The candidates of the ruling party ran a campaign on Facebook in all 59 self-governing communities. In the case of the UNM, 45 self-governing community candidates were active. In addition, 22 other political candidates from 7 political parties and 5 mayoral candidates (in self-governing communities) nominated by initiative groups ran on the platform. Among the Georgian Dream candidates, Mamuka Tsotseria (Zugdidi Municipality) was the most active on Facebook, while Avtandil Talakvadze (Ozurgeti Municipality) had the highest interaction. Among the UNM candidates, Giorgi Kharchilava (Tsalenjikha municipality) published the most posts on Facebook, while Misha Bolkvadze (Khelvachauri municipality) had the highest user interaction.

**Number of posts published on the Facebook pages of self-governing communities  
mayoral candidates**


(2 August - 2 October, 2021)



Source: CrowdTangle




**Interaction of self-governing communities mayoral candidates' Facebook pages  
(2 August - 2 October, 2021)**



Source: CrowdTangle


Giorgi Kharchilava, the United National Movement mayoral candidate of Tsalenjikha, was distinguished by his social media activity and interaction, compared to other candidates in the second round. The interaction on the candidate's page increased especially after the second round, according to the results of which he became the only elected mayor from the opposition.

**Number of posts published on the Facebook pages of the self-governing community  
mayoral candidates participating in the second round  
(3 October - 6 November, 2021)**



Source: CrowdTangle

**Facebook page interaction of the self-governing community mayoral candidates participating in the second round**  
(3 October - 6 November, 2021)




**1.3. Official Instagram Campaign**


Part of the political parties and candidates for the 2021 local self-government elections were campaigning on Instagram through posts posted on accounts in addition to posting ads. The posts on the platform mainly served to form a positive image of the candidates or to spread positive messages about the political party.

From August 2 to November 6, the main accounts of 10 political parties running in the elections were active on Instagram. Girchi had the highest number of followers (7,332). The highest number of posts on the platform was published by Girchi - More Freedom, which was significantly ahead of other political party accounts in terms of the number of user interactions on the published posts.



**Types of posts published on political parties' Instagram accounts**  
(2 August - 6 November, 2021)



Source: CrowdTangle



Among the Tbilisi mayoral candidates, 6 of them used Instagram account. Ana Dolidze published the most posts on the platform. She mostly addressed her users with videos. Kakha Kaladze, the candidate of the Georgian Dream, was distinguished by the number of user interactions on published posts. The least active and responsive account on the platform belonged to the candidate of Lelo, Ana Bibilashvili.



#### 1.4. Official TikTok campaign

TikTok political accounts used various interactive methods of delivering messages to the audience. Among the candidates' channels, Kakha Kaladze's TikTok information campaign was characterized by active, positive and less political messages. Ana Dolidze, one of the Tbilisi mayoral candidates, used the platform to present her party's visions with short videos.

The Batumi organizations of "Girchi - More Freedom", "Girchi", "Droa", "Georgian Dream", "Labor Party", "Lelo" and "For Georgia" were active on TikTok. "Girchi - More Freedom" devoted its channel to their political program visions. The channels of "Girchi", "Droa" and "Labor Party" were distinguished by interactive materials with the audience, where users had the opportunity to ask questions to party leaders and get answers in the form of videos. Among the political leaders, videos were published by the channels of Giga Bokeria, Mikheil Saakashvili and Irakli Garibashvili.

#### 1.5. Official Telegram campaign

Telegram channels were used by election subjects for direct communication with voters. Nika Melia's Telegram channel shared election posters and Facebook links. Two active Ukrainian-language channels acting on behalf of Mikheil Saakashvili mainly shared the politicians appeals and information about his health condition. "Free Georgia" was being active by sharing links from YouTube and engaged in a media discrediting campaign with homophobic and anti-liberal messages. The channel "Girchi Kingdom" shared links of the "Zoom" meetings with the party candidates.

## II. Involvement of public officials and local self-government bodies in the digital election campaign

### 2.1. Involvement of public officials in the digital election campaign

ISFED examined the posts on the public Facebook profiles of 692 civil servants representing municipalities and executive bodies during the official election campaign. The campaign monitoring of the first round covered the period from August 3 to October 2, and the second round - from October 15 to October 30. The organization monitored public posts that were accessible to all Facebook users. According to the observation, part of the public servants used Facebook during working hours to spread the campaign materials of the election subjects and / or to express their political preferences and attitudes towards the candidates, which is a problematic practice in the pre-election period<sup>1</sup>. Publication of agitation materials on

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Election Code of Georgia, pre-election agitation is "calling on voters to support or oppose an election subject / candidate, as well as any public action that promotes or hinders his / her election, and / or contains signs of a pre-election campaign, including organizing / holding



Facebook by public officials during working hours, while the official election campaign is in progress, is against the rules established by the Election Code.

During the reporting period, 662 cases of agitation content were posted on the Facebook wall of 110 public servants during working hours, most of which expressed support for the Georgian Dream and were acted against opposition parties, mainly the United National Movement and For Georgia. 9 out of 662 posts expressed support for the UNM. All of them were published by public officials of Dmanisi Municipality. 1 post contained agitation in favor of the Free Georgia party.

## 2.2. Involvement of local self-government bodies in the digital election campaign

For the 2021 Municipal Elections, ISFED monitored the official Facebook pages of state institutions and studied the practice of using administrative resources against them within the limits set by the Electoral Code. The observation showed that there was no party election agitation on the official Facebook pages of the local self-governments, however, the active dissemination of materials reflecting the activities of the incumbent mayors, council members, who were also candidates, put them in an advantageous position. Municipal Facebook pages mainly published photos of self-government activities. However, the Facebook pages of the municipalities actively posted visits of the Prime Minister of Georgia to the municipalities within the pre-election campaign. The material was often shared on the Georgian Government's Facebook page.

At the beginning of the election campaign, ISFED found that the videos posted on the Facebook pages of the Zugdidi Municipality Sakrebulo and Tsalenjikha Municipality were related to the office of the Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti Trustee. In addition, the Facebook page of the Zugdidi Municipality Sakrebulo was linked to the Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti regional page of the Georgian Dream and to the page of the party's Zugdidi mayoral candidate Mamuka Tsotseria. The connection was made through the cross-posting feature on Facebook videos, which means that videos were posted on the pages simultaneously, which were published in parallel on the regional pages of the representative and / or the Georgian Dream party<sup>2</sup>.

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pre-election campaign events, storing or distributing election materials, working on lists of supporters, being present in political party representations. Moreover, according to the Electoral Code, public servants are prohibited from engaging in agitation during working hours and / or when they are directly exercising their official powers.

<sup>2</sup> Municipal Elections - The First Interim Report on Social Media Monitoring, p. 12 <https://isfed.ge/en/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringi/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringis-pirveli-shualeduri-angarishi->


### III. Unofficial election campaign

#### 3.1. Discrediting campaign aimed against the ruling party

There were a total of 35 Facebook pages against the ruling party, which was reduced to 20 pages between October 23 and November 6. During the election period, a total of 4,291 posts were published on these pages, while the interaction (reaction, comment, sharing) of the posts amounted to 286,754. Apart from spreading discrediting messages against the ruling party, the pages also published supporting messages in favor of the United National Movement.

The anti-Georgian Dream parties, meanwhile, expressed support for the United National Movement and the opposition coalition. The discrediting messages were mainly directed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, the Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Gharibashvili, the Mayor of Tbilisi / Mayor candidate Kakha Kaladze, the Chairman of the ruling party Irakli Kobakhidze, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Youth of Georgia Tea Tsulukiani. The posts published in connection with the ruling party highlighted the socio-economic problems in the country. Many of the posts also aimed to portray the Georgian Dream as a pro-Russian political force.


Giorgi Gakharia, the leader of the For Georgia party, also was the victim of discrediting posts published on the pages against the Georgian Dream and the Georgian government, portraying Gakharia as a politician controlled by Ivanishvili. Similar messages were also spread against Giorgi Vashadze and Aleko Elisashvili.




(Photo 1 “ლურჯი ვირი/Blue Donkey” Shared a discrediting image of Gakharia and Ivanishvili from the page „Free Misha” Photo 2 “Ekvtime Bidzinashvili shared a picture of Ivanishvili as a currency portrait; Photo 3 – “Blue Donkey” shared “Free MIschas’s” post with the caption: “3<sup>rd</sup> day after the elections: he made gas more expensive by 20 cents”).

An organized discrediting campaign was actively launched against the ruling party's Tbilisi mayoral candidate, Kakha Kaladze. The negative messages against him were mainly related to two events, the strike of the Tbilisi Cleaning Service and the accusations made by the Ordenidze family about Kaladze's father, Karlo Kaladze, participating in corrupt deals. The posts against Kaladze were sponsored on the Facebook page "მოდო ანტიკორუპციული/Come to the Elections" created on August 31, which is related to the online publication allmedia.ge.

The negative campaign against the leaders of the ruling party intensified especially after Mikheil Saakashvili returned to Georgia and was arrested. According to the main messages spread during the run-up to the second round of elections, Saakashvili's imprisonment appeared to be in Putin's interest and was carried out the ruling party. After the second round of elections, anti-government websites mainly responded to videos released by the Penitentiary Service in which Mikheil Saakashvili was receiving food supplements while he was on a hunger strike.



Ira Ghatakishvili  
 "We will have a better result in 2024 and afterwards".



Source: Fact-a-lyzer

### 3.2. Discrediting campaign aimed against the opposition

There were 40 pages on Facebook during the election period acting against the opposition. They posted 2,406 posts with a total of 1,250,497 interactions. 479 posts published on anonymous anti-opposition sites were sponsored, for which a total of \$ 6,375<sup>3</sup> was spent. Most of the published posts contained messages against the United National Movement and the media critical of the government.



Photo 1 – Provocateurs: Miha and his puppets, he’s added new figures to his collection; Photo 2 – Provocateurs: “For who do they cloud th waters?”).

For previously mentioned reasons, TikTok accounts were created using the same name and profile picture as some Facebook pages, on which discrediting messages were spread in a format customized for the platform.

Prior to the first round, more specifically, before announcing Mikheil Saakashvili's return to Georgia, most of the discrediting messages went to Giorgi Gakharia and his political party, For Georgia. The main goal of the campaign was to connect Gakharia with Saakashvili and the UNM. The situation changed after the first round of voting, when the messages spread on these pages were still polarised, like in the 2020 and 2018 digital election campaigns. Before the second round, Mikheil Saakashvili and the United National Movement were the main targets of defamation on anti-opposition Facebook pages. From the beginning of the election campaign until the arrival of Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia, the main message was to make fun of his plans to return to Georgia. Specially created videos about this were published a few days before the elections, which were distributed in a coordinated manner. After Mikheil Saakashvili's return to Georgia, the distribution of archival material related to the crimes committed during the former government intensified. An important source of posts in this regard was the page "Archive". Along with the accusations of the previous government, the discrediting pages were aimed at portraying the "United National Movement" as an enemy of the Georgian Orthodox Church<sup>4</sup>. To achieve this, most of the pages acted in a coordinated manner. Organized pages published the same posts within a small timeframe. In addition, the act of coordination is indicated by the fact that a single entity had

<sup>3</sup> The data of the advertisements published on Facebook is indicated from 09 August to 06 November 2021.

<sup>4</sup> ISFED: The 3rd Interim Social Media Monitoring Report October 21, 2021 <https://isfed.ge/geo/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringi/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringis-mesame-shualeduri-angarishi>



ordered/paid for all of the sponsored posts, whose identity cannot be identified / confirmed based on the given data.




(Photo 1 - God bless us : “Georgia does not deserve enemies of the church, spread this video”; Photo 2 – Political absurdity/ “Porridge boss”).

Discrediting posts were published against Mamuka Khazaradze, the leader of "Lelo", after he announced his resignation from the parliament. Some of the posts against his political party were aimed at portraying "Lelo" as a force led by Mikheil Saakashvili.

In the post-election period, one of the topics of defamation on the anti-opposition pages was the protest and election results of the opposition obtained in the first round. Attention was mainly given to the small number of people on pre-announced rallies<sup>5</sup>. After the second round of the elections, discrediting posts were disseminated that related to the footage spread by the Penitentiary Service in which Saakashvili is taking food supplements. The posts ridiculed Mikheil Saakashvilis hunger strike and showed this type of protest in a frivolous manner.

<sup>5</sup> ISFED: 4th Interim Social Media Monitoring Report; November 19, 2021. <https://isfed.ge/geo/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringi/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringis-mekhute-shualeduri-angarishi>



*Source: Fact-a-lyzer*


### 3.3. Discrediting campaign aimed against the media

One of the main activities of the anonymous / coordinated pages in the 2021 local self-government elections was related to the defamation of media outlets that are critical of the government. There was an active campaign against media managers and individual journalists. In addition to anti-political party pages, there were also pages specifically targeted at media outlets and journalists for the same purpose, whose names and posts indicated at their intentions.

Anti-opposition media outlets actively disseminated footage of the November 7, 2007 raid on Imedi by the Special Forces and also spread statements made by journalists during that period. They tried to demean the credibility of active journalists. Such posts were mainly addressed to Giorgi Targamadze,

the host of Formula One, Nika Gvaramia, the General Director, and Nodar Meladze, the TV presenter of TV Pirveli<sup>6</sup>.

The presenters and individual correspondents of the channels critical of the government were also the targets of the attack on the coordinated pages. Their derogatory posts were often linked to verbal mistakes made in the conversation. Abnormal behavior in the performance of journalistic activities by female correspondents was also presented in a negative context. The negative social media campaign against journalists working on channels critical of the government was unprecedented in its scale, intensity and negative nature compared to the previous elections. Posts against TV Imedi and PosTV were published in separate posts, mainly on pro-opposition pages. Their biased coverage of events in favor of the ruling party was underlined. Some of the posts presented Imedi TV as a pro-Russian broadcasting network.



### 3.4. Campaign against non-government organizations

In addition to anti-opposition and anti-government media outlets, anonymous, discrediting, and manipulative posts were published against observer organizations on defamatory Facebook pages. These pages attacked the observer organizations because of their criticism of the Election administration and/or evaluation of the ongoing election process. The purpose of the posts was to destructively portray observer organizations, media outlets that criticized the election administration. The main tactic was to present them as an extension of the UNM and Mikheil Saakashvili, as if all the criticism expressed by them was instructed by Saakashvili. Active and suspicious accounts that appear on these pages circulated posts to public groups with thousands of members, they sought to reinforce to specific narratives with aggressive

<sup>6</sup> ISFED: 4th Interim Social Media Monitoring Report - October 28, 2021. <https://isfed.ge/geo/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringi/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringis-meotkhe-shualeduri-angarishi>




and offensive comments. In the second case, the same coordinated pages and unauthorized accounts that stole the identity mainly from Russian social media users and were involved in spreading false information about the CEC. It is noteworthy that from the content of the posts and the behavior of the pages, it was clear that there was a deliberate false criticism of the CEC.

The target of attack by the pages was mainly ISFED among the observer organizations. Such attacks became particularly active after the organization refused to engage in a special advisory group recruitment process. It is noteworthy that sexist attacks on its female staff and observers were used in connection with ISFED<sup>7</sup>.

ISFED also found fake reports that were used to artificially distribute posts on these pages and whose identities - in the form of photos - were stolen from Russian social media platforms<sup>8</sup>.

### 3.5. False Media

False media strategy was still used in the 2021 local self-government elections. Such pages are disguised as media platforms but they selectively spread information and sponsor posts that present their patron/s positively and opponents negatively. Posts that do not express political interests are usually not sponsored. 1,010 posts were posted on 21 false media pages on Facebook during the election period. The total number of interactions reached 168,742. According to ISFED, 208 posts were sponsored on false media pages. The strategies and tactics of those behind the organized pages of false media, which are repeatedly deleted by Facebook, changed in December 2019 and afterwards. They set up websites sharing the same name as their Facebook page, in order to disguise themselves as a legitimate media platform, although these websites do not post news. The format and structure of the web pages clearly indicate their uniformity, artificiality and purpose of disguise.




(Photo 1 – Samegrelo Times: Ana Tsitlidze: I will imitate Misha in everything coward ex-president and Olia Ana; Photo 2 – Blog News: Cartoonist Nugzar Metreveli, who is linked with the United National Movement, published an offensive cartoon of the patriarch; Photo 3 – Blog News: Everyone at Rustaveli on November the 7<sup>th</sup>. 14 year anniversary of the bloody 7<sup>th</sup> of November).

<sup>7</sup> ISFED: Second Interim Report on Social Media Monitoring - September 30, 2021 <https://isfed.ge/geo/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringi/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringis-me-2-shualeduri-angarishi>

<sup>8</sup> ISFED: "Manipulation campaign on Facebook regarding the election process" <https://isfed.ge/geo/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringi/manipulatsiuri-kampania-Facebook-ze-saarchevno-protsebetan-dakavshirebit>

Municipal-oriented false media pages also appeared in the 2021 local government elections. They acted locally, using tactics similar to those of national scale false media pages; The posts were published in favor of a local candidate and were also trying to openly or indirectly discredit his opponent. During the reporting period, one page was active against the opposition - the Samegrelo Times • Samegrelo Times and one page (Zugdidi Today) acted in support of Zugdidi mayoral candidate Anzor Melia. Prior to the second round of local elections, the page “Guria Times” continued its negative campaign against the independent Ozurgeti mayoral candidate, Konstantine Sharashenidze. On October 29, the day before the second round of voting, a fake poster of Konstantine Sharashenidze was published on the page, that had a photo of him with the election number of the United National Movement and the text: "We must return the National Movement to Ozurgeti"<sup>9</sup>.



Source: Fact-a-lyzer

### 3.6. Fake support

The page "Misha in Georgia on October 2 • mishasakartveloshi", which presented itself as a supporter of Mikheil Saakashvili, was used to discredit the United National Movement with false support tactics. A total of 47 posts were posted on this page, with a total of 29,603 interactions. Half (24) of the posts published on the platform, were sponsored. The page was pretending to be created in support Mikheil Saakashvili and to respond positively to the former president's homecoming. However, later on, due to the content and pathos of the posts, it became clear that the purpose of the page was not to support Saakashvili or the UNM, but rather to discredit them. According to the content of the originally published posts, this page should have been interesting and credible mainly for the supporters of UNM and Mikheil Saakashvili. However, after reaching their desired audience, messages started to spread, which served to highlight a conflict between

<sup>9</sup> Myth Detector (29.10. 2021). "Guria Times publishes a fake poster about Ozurgeti independent candidate." [https://www.mythdetector.ge/ka/myth/guria-times-ozurgetis-damoukidebeli-kandidatis-shesakheb-gagalbebul-posters-akveqnebs?fbclid=IwAR2ok2rqgxXDOVvYQUITuok2Wav3nrBab4eak0oh95vbQHk15Mhll\\_n-rNdE](https://www.mythdetector.ge/ka/myth/guria-times-ozurgetis-damoukidebeli-kandidatis-shesakheb-gagalbebul-posters-akveqnebs?fbclid=IwAR2ok2rqgxXDOVvYQUITuok2Wav3nrBab4eak0oh95vbQHk15Mhll_n-rNdE)

Mikheil Saakashvili, Nika Melia and other opposition politicians, which was published in the form of sponsored posts. Subsequently, posts with similar content were spread to other anonymous pages operating against the opposition or were directly shared from a false support page. This page was supposedly intended to confuse the voters of the United National Movement and to weaken the support for Nika Melia in the party.



(Photo 1 – mishasakartveloshi [ Misha in Georgia]: “Who do you support in the conflict between Nika Melia and Mikheil Saakashvili”;  
Photo 2 – mishasakartveloshi: “Share if you support Mikheil Saakashvili”).

### 3.7. Supporting Facebook pages

#### 3.7.1. Pages supporting the ruling party

30 pages acted in support of the Georgian Dream and the government in the local self-government elections. The total number of user interactions on the 4,027 posts published on these pages during the reporting period reached 1,116,632. The posts published on these pages at the beginning of the election campaign mainly expressed support for the ruling party. However, after the first round of elections, they largely switched to a discrediting campaign against the opposition. The rhetoric and messages on some of the supporting pages changed after Saakashvili was found in Georgia, and negative posts have often been linked to this subject. After Nika Melia presented the composition of the opposition coalition cabinet to the Tbilisi City Hall, the party leaders in the coalition also became targets of defamation by the pages.



Part of the support pages were aimed at increasing the support of the local candidates of the ruling party. Among them were pages that acted in favor of Rustavi and Batumi mayoral candidates Nino Latsabidze and Archil Chikovani.

The administrator of several pages had either been working openly, or ISFED had established links with government agencies. The pages: "Analytical Page", "Leader 41" and "Supporters of Irakli Kobakhidze" are managed by Davit Tordia, a supporter of the ruling party. According to ISFED, the Government StratCom is connected to the following anonymous pages that act in favor of the Georgian Dream: "What is being done" ("Garibashvili for Georgia"), "Bidzina Ivanishvili for Georgia", "Irakli Garibashvili 4 Georgia"<sup>10</sup>.

The address of the platform - gasamartldes.ge - was actively shared on pro-government pages, calling on citizens to sign a petition to demand the trial of Mikheil Saakashvili. There was also a pro-government page that was disguised as a page of religious and nationalist beliefs and was actively involved in the campaign in support of the Prime Minister, where he is portrayed as a defender of the Orthodox Church and national traditions<sup>11</sup>.



(Photo 1 - Garibashvili for Georgia - The first, 2 km section of the Rikoti

### 3.7.2. Pages supporting the opposition

Some Facebook pages acted with the aim to popularize a part of the opposition parties. There were 40 such pages active during the election period, with a total of 8,782 posts, and the number of interactions on these posts was 669,188.

Out of 40 pages, 30 pages were in favor of the "United National Movement" and / or Mikheil Saakashvili, 4 pages were in favor of the Party "For Georgia", and the rest were in favor of "Strategy Aghmashenebeli", "the Alliance of Georgian Patriots", "For the People" or "Aleko Elisashvili – Citizens". One page, „საქართველოს ევროპული მომავალი/Georgia's European Future“, published posts in support of the Labor Party at the beginning of the reporting period, and later mainly for Mikheil Saakashvili.

The pages supporting the United National Movement mainly shared programs made by government criticizing media

<sup>10</sup> Connection of Covert Information Campaign with Government Agencies", ISFED, July 20, 2021

<sup>11</sup> The page is linked to another page that uses similar tactics on Facebook – „საქართველო უპირველეს ყოვლისა/Georgia first“. Identical payer for ads on both pages. <https://isfed.ge/geo/sotsialuri-mediis-monitoringi/faruli-sainformatsio-kampaniis-kavshiri-samtavrobo-utskebtban>





(Photo 1 –I didn’t sell Georgia” – “November 6<sup>th</sup> 17:00 at Rustavi prison” Photo 2 –The deciding battle for the saving Georgia – “We will have better results in 2024 and afterwards as well” – Irakli Kobakhidze).

#### IV. Unofficial TikTok campaign

Some of the channels that defamate the opposition on the Tiktok platform bore the names of well-known sarcastic pages operating on Facebook and disseminating similar or identical material, indicating the widespread, organized nature of the discrediting campaigns on different platforms. Defamatory Tiktok channels behaved similarly to some Facebook pages by the abundance of sarcastic, or often hateful, media videos.

Channels that spread ultra-nationalist and propagandistic messages demanding the trial of Mikheil Saakashvili also participated in the discrediting campaigns.

The behavior of anti-Georgian Dream defamatory channels was diverse. They sarcastically chanted phrases from party leaders, later, for the election period, they switched to campaigns in support of opposition leaders.

The channels operating for anonymous support were mainly in favor of the National Movement or the United Opposition. There was also a channel in support of Tbilisi mayoral candidate Ana Dolidze. The Georgian Dream support channel - “Leader 41” was also active on the platform, which also acts as a pro-government Facebook page with the same name.

TikTok also had false media channels whose names and logos gave the impression that they had informational purposes. The common method of false media channels was to selectively cut excerpts from media newscasts and distribute them for political purposes. These channels resorted to another method, which involved filming videos on the headlines of the articles against the background of loud music and text comments, which helped them to disseminate information material.

## Methodology

The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) has been monitoring social media in the context of 2021 local self-government elections. Social media monitoring mostly covers monitoring of Facebook, the most popular social media site on the Georgian market<sup>12</sup>. In addition, ISFED is also monitoring important trends identified in the election context on Instagram, TikTok, Telegram and other social media sites.

Social media monitoring of ISFED focuses on the following three main areas:

1. Monitoring official social media pages of parties, their leaders, candidates, as well as different public institutions and municipal bodies during the election period, and monitoring activities of individual civil servants on social media at the local level, during the election period;
2. Monitoring anonymous pages/groups/actors operating for political purposes, including monitoring of political discreditation campaigns, anonymous and fake support pages, false media pages;
3. Monitoring of pages/groups/actors disseminating value-based divisive narratives and disinformation.

The purpose of monitoring official pages of political/electoral subjects is to evaluate compliance of their campaign on social media with the requirements of the electoral legislation, including identification of violations of campaigning rules, use of hate speech, dissemination of anti-Western messages and other important trends. The purpose of monitoring pages of public/municipal bodies is to evaluate their activities throughout the campaign period and identify uses of administrative resources in favor of a party, if any. The purpose of monitoring activities of civil servants on social media is to identify the facts of illegal campaigning during working time.

Monitoring of agitation by local self-government public officials involves observing agitation materials publicly published on their personal profile during the pre-election period. During the pre-election period, the organization monitors 692 officials employed in local self-governments, who hold important and key positions in the City Hall and the City Council. These individuals were selected by ISFED long-term observers to monitor the pre-election processes in the municipalities. This category of monitoring refers to the official election period when the relevant rules established by the election legislation are in force.

The purpose of monitoring anonymous political sites, groups or other actors is to identify large-scale anonymous campaigns designed to influence the electorate and public sentiment, to study them, to decrypt non-authentic networks. This category includes campaigns to discredit a political actor, media outlet, non-governmental organization or civil activist, campaigns in support of political parties or the government, false support and false media pages. Such tactics are typical for both election and non-election periods. The

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<sup>12</sup> According to the annual report of the social media management platform Hootsuite and the global creative / advertising agency We Are Social, 2.7 million active social media users were registered in Georgia at the beginning of 2020, and Facebook announces the possibility of advertising up to 2.5 million users in Georgia. . Source: Digital 2020: Georgia, Hootsuite & We Are Social, February 18, 2020 <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-georgia>

current report covers the results of the monitoring of anonymous pages in the period from August 2 to November 6, 2021.

Monitoring is carried out by specially selected and trained social media monitors, with the involvement of the researcher, data analyst, and under the supervision of program managers.

Two social media monitoring tools - Fact-a-lyzer and CrowdTangle are used for collection, classification and analysis of data. Fact-a-lyzer is a software developed by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) based on ISFED methodology, which allows collection of public posts on Facebook through API, their classification, data processing and analysis. Through Fact-a-lyzer ISFED monitors are able to analyze and categorize each post published by the pages studied within the monitoring. CrowdTangle is a social media analysis tool of Facebook, which allows monitoring of public content of Facebook groups and pages, as well as verified profiles and Instagram accounts and their interactions. ISFED gained access to CrowdTangle through Facebook's Academics and Researchers program.

Social media monitoring methodology of ISFED was designed for the 2018 presidential election and was adapted according to challenges of the 2021 local self-government elections.

## Annexes

**Annex 1. Activity and Interaction of official organizational Facebook pages of political parties** (August 2 – November 6, 2021; Source: CrowdTange)

#	Political Party	Number of Pages	Posts	Total Interaction	Average Interaction
1	UNM	96	5,237	552,024	105
2	Georgian Dream	69	4,183	1,281,346	306
3	For Georgia	63	6,127	313,815	51
4	Strategy Agmashenebeli	35	1,717	42,940	25
5	Lelo	30	1,727	113,377	66
6	European Georgia	20	1,321	84,568	64
7	Girchi – More Freedom	9	926	100,882	109
8	Free Choice – New Alternative	9	239	434	2
9	Alliance of Patriots of Georgia	8	276	4,857	18
10	Labor Party	7	492	5,558	11
11	Tribuna	5	190	2,285	12
12	Girchi	4	431	116,784	271
13	Free Georgia	3	293	91,126	311
14	For People	3	170	4,573	27
15	Aleko Elisashvili – Citizens	3	45	2,652	59
16	Tamaze Metchiauri for United Georgia	1	57	28,444	499
17	Green Party	1	68	27,159	399
18	New Christian Democrats	1	155	19,184	124
19	Droa	1	205	18,264	89
20	People’s Party	1	70	8,497	121
21	Reformer	1	24	1,754	73
22	European Democrats	1	107	1,578	15
23	European Socialists	1	58	1,564	27
24	For Social Justice	1	42	1,011	24
25	Freedom – the Way of Zviad Gamsakhurdia	1	8	506	63
26	Reformators	1	40	315	8
27	Law and Justice	1	7	35	5
28	Leftist Alliance	1	43	31	1
29	Future Georgia	1	29	15	1
30	Our United Georgia	1	1	4	4



**Annex 2. Anonymous pages and posts on the discrediting Georgian Dream and the Georgian Government pages (02 August - 06 November; 2021; Source Fact-a-lyzer)**

#	Page	ID	Creation Date	Followers	Posts
1	თანამოაზრეთა გაერთიანება-საქართველო	254870331218231	21-09-2011	6,924	1,414
2	ლურჯი ვირი	105608390900542	13-11-2019	1,064	998
3	ფოთი - ჩვენი სევდა და ტკივილი	104293511895233	13-06-2021	621	237
4	Your Page Δ	282125661960722	12-04-2014	231,049	228
5	Ira Ghatakishvili-ირა დატაკიშვილი	110523991402510	08-10-2021	59	213
6	პოლიტიკური ვექტორი	1505159526363639	20-06-2014	3,692	200
7	Миша Вернихс - მიშა დაბრუნდი	433407350169932	23-05-2015	34,103	126
8	როდის მიდის? როდის მოდის?	123291642950680	05-02-2021	90	119
9	საქართველოსთვის	1642241549183302	26-10-2017	16,726	116
10	Political მემფზ	184890065770012	04-11-2018	16,345	106
11	ექვთიმე ბიძინაშვილი	111219563866411	02-04-2020	8,382	94
12	ქვეყნის არაფორმალური მმართველი #ქამ	109504527120984	30-09-2019	80	78
13	ქოცების დასაცინი ოფიციალური სააგენტო	635134340461924	07-08-2020	3,580	74
14	თავისუფალი აზრი	109312640481698	11-10-2019	258	64
15	ანტი-ქოცი	100430098228036	19-02-2020	18	43
16	Qocoba texavs	653834361679180	16-11-2018	1,218	37
17	Annual events ყოველწლიური მოვლენები	113129460101839	17-10-2019	59	30
18	პირველწყარო	103886053115074	06-01-2013	13,357	23
19	ნოზაძე	114159920282892	04-05-2020	968	19
20	Liberal ემიგრანტთა ლიგა	247566080496433	14-09-2021	164	11
21	ქოცნება	1185571358124831	28-10-2015	2,273	8
22	მოგიტყანთ ოცნება სრული შემადგენლობით ო	709792172430649	19-10-2014	3,358	7
23	ჯონდო მძლეთამძლე ჰერკულესი	103249792097136	31-08-2021	285	7
24	ბიძინა ივანიშვილის „ჩაჯმული ოცნება“	1389904931306938	25-12-2014	558	6
25	მდააა	586360244718779	22-05-2013	9,518	6
26	მოდი არჩევნებზე	101495418943031	31-08-2021	1,841	5
27	გაყალბებული ოქმები	106512657855654	03-09-2020	6,683	5
28	მატრახbuzzy	1711383712444329	08-06-2016	4,238	4
29	ძირს ბიძინა ივანიშვილი	1374728269520641	24-03-2015	3,467	3
30	დავნებდეთ	264249658769971	21-09-2021	139	3
31	მე მიყვარს ქოცები მოგიტყანთ ცოლები	350075618678906	06-10-2016	528	2
32	Stop oligarch	100408144648906	03-08-2019	617	2
33	20 ლარიანების ბრბო ღღ	1012465325464451	27-07-2015	2,341	1

34	გამოსირებულ	870948259594117	17-02-2015	540	1
35	ერთობა საქართველოსთვის	117867680051508	10-09-2020	589	1
				<b>ჯამი</b>	<b>4,291</b>

**Annex 3. Anonymous pages and posts on the discrediting Opposition pages (02 August - 06 November; 2021; Source Fact-a-lyzer)**

#	Page	ID	Creation Date	Followers	Posts
1	Provocateurs	100947952262913	03-07-2021	1,173	325
2	სარკრაზმელები	104764438535503	29-06-2021	3,880	294
3	მიხეილ უკრაინოლოგი	102131411314617	31-12-2019	64,739	282
4	სიმართლის დროა	216787411791015	18-12-2012	3,136	277
5	არქივი - Archive	107692938260573	29-07-2021	38,975	151
6	მიხეილ დადამაშენებელი	108308254389676	15-10-2020	3,981	135
7	Informer	105832888428587	30-06-2021	1,143	119
8	უფალო შეგვიწყალო	127774219478087	04-08-2021	2,158	88
9	2012-იანულები	239219396599898	10-08-2017	1,834	77
10	ქვეყნის მტრები	105609044355904	12-02-2020	6,444	74
11	ჟურნალისტი	106346231525620	08-03-2021	1,740	62
12	სირცხვილის კორიდორი	365807634291022	21-05-2019	41,889	47
13	Politics	110045728041963	29-07-2021	1,271	41
14	პოლიტიკური აბსურდი	102303105528701	01-09-2021	1,482	41
15	სექტა	196520447903760	15-11-2018	17,389	40
16	გლდანელი	104612225255960	29-07-2021	989	36
17	FAKE დეტექტორი	102880908549166	11-03-2021	5,617	32
18	ქართული ჟურნალისტიკის მარგალიტები / journalist fails	110044894712197	31-07-2021	4,871	31
19	საქართველოს მავნებლები და მავნებლობა	841630609353767	21-02-2018	583	30
20	Politics - პოლიტიკა	102410355547719	28-09-2021	1,406	26
21	რეალობა	410560459135063	27-07-2015	4,895	24
22	ჟურნალისტები	105666898265157	11-03-2021	18,573	22
23	პოლიტიკური სატირა / Political Satire	107034578358462	17-08-2021	1,759	22
24	ნაცების დასაცინი ოფიციალური სააგენტო	1427267720749793	13-05-2019	21,107	19
25	ძალა სიმართლეშია	244454536211424	14-08-2018	3,593	13
26	ვარკეთილი	120741956845845	29-07-2021	633	13
27	პოლიტიკური ტიანშანი	149713882146470	11-09-2016	287	12
28	აგიტატორი	102002635467150	17-06-2021	219	12
29	FouYou	103557695263125	22-05-2021	297	11
30	პრიორიტეტული მიმართულებების განვითარების ცენტრი	102112524873533	05-06-2020	1,997	10
31	Video Digest	107956387384709	26-12-2019	3,100	9

32	ნაცი კლავს	615263905241922	06-03-2015	3,094	7
33	არამიშას	289163798600835	05-11-2018	4,003	6
34	People's voice • ხალხის ხმა	289043011731297	13-11-2018	541	5
35	თავისუფლება მიშასგან	110354978096730	18-10-2021	338	5
36	პუფები	102862142035991	10-06-2021	45	3
37	სტრატეგია ჩხარტიშვილი	101511398789964	10-05-2021	117	2
38	ლუკას გვერდი - Luka	1479807065579380	18-01-2014	142,304	1
39	სისხლიანი/მოძალადე ნაც. რეჟიმი - გვახსოვს	1933449840047943	28-08-2018	56	1
40	Zonder	105598088546870	19-09-2021	240	1
<b>ჯამი</b>					<b>2,406</b>

**Annex 4. False Media pages and number of posts (02 August - 06 November 2021; Source: Fact-a-lyzer)**

#	Page	ID	Creation Date	Followers	Posts
1	Adjara News	109234980712256	20-03-2020	17,345	249
2	Guria Times • გურია თაიშსი	758522870940459	27-08-2015	7,292	195
3	GeoPress	107490771649032	20-08-2021	1,154	117
4	სიახლეების ბლოგი • Blog News	108019154915381	30-07-2021	5,850	112
5	ხაშურის მუნიციპალიტეტი • Khashuri Municipality	204718192872097	27-02-2011	16,450	65
6	Samegrelo Times • სამეგრელო თაიშს	168197118643629	13-08-2021	1,168	33
7	ეროვნული ამბები - National News	107332544994056	16-08-2021	1,656	32
8	წალენჯიხის პოზიცია	113268430335842	09-04-2020	984	28
9	Telavi today	101744938920475	06-09-2021	540	25
10	Media Digest	107750074095037	13-01-2020	721	24
11	Tsalenjikha News / წალენჯიხა	110935328037314	18-10-2021	216	20
12	რუსთავი•news	113069691031110	02-07-2021	1,558	19
13	Zugdidi Info / ზუგდიდი	102854948859849	19-10-2021	1,146	18
14	თბილისის მაცნე	104809361844518	26-07-2021	1,516	17
15	Georgian Report	104139037916416	02-04-2020	512	15
16	Tsalenjikha / წალენჯიხა	130809254294623	14-11-2017	7,012	15
17	ზუგდიდი დღეს	110462471333296	05-08-2021	270	12
18	ნიუს ჰაბი•newshub	219433834903801	06-12-2013	9,593	7
19	პოლიტ მაცნე	100239868164358	24-12-2019	440	5
20	მნიუსი Mnews	145028352195794	21-08-2010	15,102	1
21	სიახლეები სამეგრელოდან და სვანეთიდან	884806308222032	11-11-2015	4,942	1
<b>ჯამი</b>					<b>1,010</b>

**Annex 5. Fake Supporting pages and number of posts (02 August - 06 November 2021; Source: Fact-a-lyzer)**

#	Page	ID	Creation Date	Followers	Posts
1	2 ოქტომბერს მიშა საქართველოში:mishasaka rtveloshi	100864589029792	21-09-2021	984	47
2	გიორგი რურუას მხარდამჭერები	101827468258842	25-06-2020	1,360	4
				<b>ჯამი</b>	<b>51</b>

**Annex 6. Pages Supporting GD and Georgian Government and the posts published (02 August - 06 November, 2021; Source: Fact-a-lyzer)**

#	Page	ID	Creation Date	Followers	Posts
1	ლიდერი 41	2220044331551918	20-02-2019	40,459	1,323
2	Bidzina Ivanishvili for Georgia	293141757525205	18-07-2014	89,777	526
3	Irakli Garibashvili Supporters	101431448708189	18-03-2021	2,318	380
4	Defence Georgia საქართველოს თავდაცვა	1488708571376670	26-08-2014	89,284	334
5	ბიძინა ივანიშვილის მხარდამჭერები/Bidzina Ivanishvili	794085760789269	22-05-2018	17,302	314
6	Irakli Garibashvili 4 Georgia	326815664127831	02-11-2013	33,368	182
7	წარმატებული ლიდერები . Tsarmatebuli Liderebi	177438399278852	20-01-2016	8,053	177
8	რა კეთდება	321616111726475	17-11-2018	62,898	145
9	ქართული ოცნება ჩემი არჩევანია - 41	108652531483661	31-07-2021	3,785	82
10	რუსთავი შესაძლებლობების ქალაქი	124918312607552	18-08-2020	6,373	71
11	კახი კალაძე & საზოგადოება	438747016298433	29-06-2015	18,613	66
12	ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილის მხარდამჭერები	101205788170619	06-03-2020	9,234	66
13	ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილის მხარდამჭერები2	142062014398918	18-02-2021	9,203	57
14	ვაზისუბანი	660068950795521	01-10-2015	3,140	46
15	41	682220762160796	04-10-2018	3,112	38
16	ქართული სული/sakartvelo	100228529055792	20-08-2021	931	37
17	Kaladze	108587997474773	08-04-2020	7,684	32

18	თიანეთის მაცნე	378491105897637	02-12-2017	815	26
19	აღვადგინოთ წესრიგი	100936088717076	20-02-2021	2,065	26
20	საქართველო უპირველეს ყოვლისა	105132801907394	01-09-2021	1,309	21
21	კალა	249535448576108	02-07-2014	38,812	17
22	საქართველო უპირველეს ყოვლის	170012275133106	15-08-2021	2,268	16
23	ბიძინა ივანიშვილი • Bidzina Ivanishvili	266044340102232	07-10-2011	47,363	9
24	ჭეშმარიტი მართლმადიდებელი	597601803612213	08-09-2013	9,463	8
25	ირაკლი კობახიძის მხარდამჭერები	107165021219833	20-11-2020	1,873	8
26	ჯარი	111451686924680	29-09-2019	22,248	5
27	კალაძე / LIVE	106163177386454	27-07-2019	1,010	5
28	ვახტანგ გომელაურის მხარდამჭერები	109095460964119	06-10-2020	3,021	5
29	დავით კარგარეთელის მხარდამჭერები/David Kargaretelinin tərəfdarları	100192192393106	20-08-2021	1,213	4
30	ანალიტიკური გვერდი	102477381214970	10-11-2019	1,300	1
				<b>ჯამი</b>	<b>4,027</b>

**Annex 7. ოპოზიციური პარტიების მხარდამჭერი გვერდები და მათ მიერ გამოქვეყნებული პოსტების რაოდენობა (02 აგვისტო - 06 ნოემბერი, 2021; წყარო: Fact-a-lyzer)**

#	Page	Supported Party	ID	Creation Date	Followers	Posts
1	ყოველდღიური მოვლენები	UNM	1801752189891333	14-07-2018	72,837	5,849
2	Gakharia & Media	For Georgia	230304133690655	09-10-2011	101,373	439
3	მე არ ვაყვიდე საქართველო	UNM	371425542935230	03-10-2012	10,635	342
4	Giorgi's Page	UNM	103318044736016	23-05-2020	21,123	336
5	ქართული სიყვარული	UNM/Opposition	472911626456023	06-07-2018	21,326	289
6	გადამწყვეტი ბრძოლა საქართველოს გადასარჩენად	UNM	100319661329439	07-08-2019	22,479	191
7	ალეკო ელისაშვილი თბილისის მერად	Aleko Elisashvili - Citizens	426583940736041	04-10-2012	7,717	185
8	თავისუფალი ზონა	UNM	304430243009865	09-12-2012	37,066	158
9	საერთო-სახალხო მოძრაობა მიხეილ სააკაშვილის თავისუფლებისთვის	UNM	100198099084620	10-09-2021	2,127	137
10	მიშა პრემიერად	UNM	1687218654858746	27-04-2015	3,794	120

11	სამოქალაქო მოძრაობა-ხმა	UNM	106688146858478	18-04-2018	17,318	74
12	ილო თიანეთისთვის	UNM	103348862060976	15-08-2021	724	71
13	თავისუფლება მიშას - Free Misha	UNM	103181785479439	08-10-2021	1,614	71
14	მიხეილ სააკაშვილის მხარდამჭერები - Mikheil Saakashvili's supporters	UNM	2011658575752039	22-04-2018	2,666	62
15	მიხეილ სააკაშვილი ლიდერი	UNM	1621638588160822	15-05-2016	8,985	62
16	გიორგი ვაშაძე პრემიერ-მინისტრად / Giorgi Vashadze Prime Minister	Strategy Agmashenebeli	113303490466952	26-07-2020	690	59
17	The voice of politics / პოლიტიკის ხმა	UNM	100683438878783	14-05-2021	4,245	58
18	საქართველოში უნდა გათენდეს	UNM	107835507272396	12-09-2019	5,937	50
19	მოძრაობა საქართველოს მომავლისთვის movement for the future Georgia	UNM	1499974593589850	23-10-2014	26,967	41
20	თავთავი კლუბი / Tavtavi Club	UNM	100257858738042	18-01-2021	952	32
21	რა ხდებოდა მიშას დროს - Georgia During Mishas Time	UNM	104866755216849	16-07-2021	2,555	27
22	ჭიათურის საათი	APG	588039874663091	18-01-2015	14,731	24
23	საქართველოს ევროპული მომავალი	UNM/Labor Party	849769971841364	05-08-2017	8,111	16
24	გახარია & მედია	For Georgia	110253144492450	28-03-2021	3,354	15
25	Dolidze&Media	For People	380001665514108	16-01-2015	5,413	14
26	არდათმო	UNM	114184320492598	04-11-2020	11,815	13
27	Unofficial: Rustavi 5	For Georgia	1396994997276044	16-02-2015	34,014	8
28	შენი ხმა / Your Voice	UNM	107450367860357	22-11-2020	1,979	6
29	გახარია "საქართველოსთვის"	For Georgia	102010018768214	28-05-2021	1,085	6
30	TV პირველი	UNM	105000947815284	24-03-2020	2,122	5
31	დადგა დრო	UNM	100729498976545	20-07-2021	1,747	4
32	რეზოლუცია	APG	263336291116171	31-07-2018	4,175	3
33	ზურიკო	UNM	107875974406710	23-09-2020	2,384	3
34	გიორგი ვაშაძის მხარდამჭერები	Strategy Agmashenebeli	112246767136598	29-04-2020	19,049	2
35	Save your choice/დაიცავი არჩევანი	UNM	110633723911099	24-03-2020	1,936	2
36	ექსპრეზიდენტ მიხეილ სააკაშვილის მომხრეები	UNM	1579032562312368	02-02-2015	3,939	2
37	ჩვენ გავათენებთ	UNM	100667871926507	10-12-2020	2,614	2
38	საქართველოში უნდა გათენდეს2	UNM	625716414738360	02-08-2020	3,318	2

39	ნიკას დროა	UNM	107594727705190	21-07-2020	2,780	1
40	უკეთესი მომავლისთვის ვირჩევთ მიხეილ საკაშვილს	UNM	110776807424194	06-09-2020	1,608	1
						<b>8,782</b>