



SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING 2018 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

SECOND INTERIM REPORT



Kingdom of the Netherlands

Social Media Monitoring

2018 Presidential Election

Second Interim Report

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Disclaimer: Names of some Facebook pages and their posts presented in this report contain vulgar and insulting language. Any such content of this report is intended with sole purpose of demonstration of discrediting content. ISFED underlines that it strictly distances itself from such pages and does not share the ideas of their posts.

I. INTRODUCTION

The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) is for the first time carrying out social media monitoring during the 2018 presidential election. Increasing role of social media and its impact within the context of elections was clearly illustrated by recent electoral processes in different countries across the globe. ISFED detected the same trend in Georgia and following the 2017 local self-government elections, made determined efforts to conduct methodological monitoring of social media. To monitor social media, a special methodology was designed and special software was developed. With respect to social media monitoring in election context, ISFED is one of the pioneers among observer organizations not only in Georgia but also throughout the world. Implementation of the social media monitoring pilot program for the 2018 presidential election was made possible with support from the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Georgia.

Monitoring results reveal that social media and especially Facebook is an important platform for political activity in Georgia. Political parties, candidates and their supporting groups are using Facebook as a strong weapon for disseminating desired information. Monitoring also indicates that Facebook is an important challenge for enforcing political financing rules, transparency requirements or limitations applicable to pre-election campaigning under the Georgian legislation.

At the 2018 presidential election, in parallel with campaign conducted mostly in abidance by the law through official pages of candidates and political parties, large-scale discrediting campaigns were waged on Facebook by anonymous pages using sponsored content. It seems that the aim of these campaigns was to influence voters and radicalize the electoral process against the background of negative campaign. Not a single political party, candidate or group openly claimed responsibility for such campaign. This practice creates serious suspicions about flow of undeclared finances in politics and electoral process. In this way, social media demonstrates important challenges to free and equal electoral environment and the State should carefully think about ways to address these challenges.

The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and its social media monitoring aims to encourage quality discussion with participation of different actors about challenges that exist with regard to impact of social media on electoral and political processes. To this end, the organization plans to develop a number of recommendations. In addition, to promote social media monitoring within electoral context and demonstrate significance of such monitoring, ISFED aims to share the experience with observer organizations and partners in different countries.

II. METHODOLOGY

The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) started social media monitoring on August 29, 2018 as the official campaign began. At this stage, ISFED monitors only Facebook activity since Facebook is especially popular among different social media platforms in Georgia. On October 26, 2018 ISFED published first interim report of social media monitoring summarizing trends identified during the first stage of the monitoring. The present report mostly deals with trends identified during the presidential runoff but it also addresses trends identified in October, as a result of monitoring during the last stages of pre-election campaign before the first round.

Generally, the scope of observation of social media monitoring by ISFED contains the following three layers:

- I. Monitoring of direct electoral activity and violation of electoral legislation on Facebook;
- II. Monitoring of attempts to discredit electoral subjects, political and electoral processes, possibly with the aim of influencing voter attitudes;
- III. Monitoring divisive value based narratives, which have become active in the election context.

This interim report covers only the first and the second layers of monitoring, including the following four areas studied by ISFED:

1. Activities of Facebook pages of presidential candidates, parties that nominated these candidates and official campaign pages, and their compliance with legislation;
2. Campaigning by local self-government civil servants on Facebook;
3. Monitoring of official Facebook pages of local self-government and Ajara A/R bodies.
4. Activity of Facebook pages set up primarily with the aim of discredit political actors and influence public opinion, their tactics and main messages;

Monitoring of official Facebook pages of presidential candidates, political parties and election campaigns aims to evaluate compliance of campaign conducted by parties and candidates using social media with requirements of the law, to identify instances of violation of campaigning rules, misuse of administrative resources, and to monitor spread of xenophobic, homophobic, anti-Western and anti-liberal, nationalistic messages in narratives of electoral subjects. To this end, ISFED studied **19 pages** that were actively involved in the pre-election campaign, representing main candidates and political parties that nominated those candidates. The second interim report of monitoring covers activity of political parties and campaign pages from **October 10 to December 2**.

The monitoring of official Facebook pages of local self-government and Ajara A/R bodies aim to evaluate the extent of use of administrative resources by pages funded by the budget and the extent of their involvement in election campaign of electoral subjects. This report covers activities of official pages of local self-governments and Ajara A/R bodies from **October 19 to December 2**.

Monitoring of campaigning by local municipal civil servants entails analysis of their personal Facebook posts that are public and contains campaigning in favor of or against any electoral subject. In this regard, the organization is monitoring **676 civil servants** of all municipalities, who are holding important or key positions. These individuals were selected with the help of ISFED long-term observers (LTOs). The present report covers monitoring of campaigning by civil servants within the periods of **October 5 – 28** and **November 15-28**.

Monitoring of pages operating for discrediting purposes aims to track anonymous Facebook pages that operate to discredit specific candidates and parties. ISFED was monitoring anonymous pages that aim to instill negative sentiments about presidential candidates, parties and political processes. The monitoring revealed a total of **160 discrediting pages**. In the process of monitoring, these pages were grouped according to different strategies used to target candidates and political processes. The second interim report includes results of monitoring pages aimed at discrediting candidates and influencing public opinions within the period from **October 19 to December 2**.

The monitoring is carried out through specially trained monitors. Monitors of the organization are using social media monitoring and analysis software – Fact-a-lyzer, which allows collection, classification, and data analysis of public posts on Facebook. The software was developed in accordance with ISFED methodology through assistance of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), under supervision of an international expert.

This second interim report evaluates trends identified by social media monitoring at the end of the pre-election period ahead of the first round of the presidential election and during the runoff. ISFED continues the monitoring and based on the analysis of information collected, it will present a final report.

III. KEY FINDINGS

The present report summarizes trends identified by ISFED during the last stage of the pre-election period of the first round, as well as in the period between the first and the second rounds of the presidential election. Findings of the monitoring confirm that Facebook was used not only for political discussions but also for discrediting campaigns against candidates, parties, observer organizations, media outlets and politically active individuals by actively spreading misinformation and a range of damaging information in an organized and purposeful manner. As soon as the first round ended, it became clear that activity and negative campaign by political groups on social media became more aggressive. Therefore, it is impossible to paint a thorough picture of the pre-election period ahead of the second round of the election without analyzing social media.

Attempts to discredit candidates and political actors through social media using sponsored content published on anonymous Facebook pages became intensive.

From October 19 to December 2, activity of mostly anonymously pages with the aim to discredit specific candidates, parties and other actors and influence public attitudes was especially striking. Number of these pages tripled before the second round. The trend of sponsoring discrediting posts to ensure their wide reach also grew.

Discrediting Facebook pages operated against Salome Zurabishvili as well as Grigol Vashadze and parties that endorsed them, using clearly negative messages.

Anonymous pages operating for discrediting purposes were divided into two camps during the pre-election period of the second round. One group was targeting Salome Zurabishvili and the ruling *Georgian Dream* party that managed her campaign, while another group was operating against Grigol Vashadze, political parties and leaders that supported him and Rustavi 2 TV. Unlike official Facebook pages of the presidential candidates and political parties that supported them, the anonymous pages waged negative, discrediting and somewhat immoral campaign. These pages were speculating with details of the candidates' personal lives and other sensitive issues. They also often published posts containing xenophobic and homophobic contents.

During the pre-election period of the second round, it became evident that discrediting pages from both sides attacked one another in an organized manner and engaged in smear campaigns in response to discrediting messages coming from the opposing side.

For instance, pages targeting Grigol Vashadze were actively disseminating posts of POST-TV campaign “#NotoMisha”, where individuals shared their difficult experiences related to the time when the UNM was in power. In response, pages operating against Salome Zurabishvili started a campaign “NotoSalome”, where former military officials referred to Salome Zurabishvili as instrument of Russia’s interests and a traitor, saying that having her as the commander-in-chief was unacceptable. In response to this campaign, pages operating against Grigol Vashadze released video interviews with former military servicemen and parents of soldiers that were killed, condemning soldiers’ remarks about the female candidate and strictly criticizing involvement of soldiers in politics and their use by the UNM for this purpose.

Ahead of the second round, fake media pages were created or became active, acting against the opposition candidate.

During the second round campaign, anonymous pages somewhat modified their strategy. Prior to the first round Election Day, discrediting Facebook pages followed the same scenario. In particular, they spread damaging information about specific candidates and their supporters. During the time between the first and the second round, fake news agency pages became active. Their names and logos led users to believe that they were ordinary news agencies, covering political processes in the country. However, in reality posts published on these pages were in support of the government on the one hand and against Grigol Vashadze and the UNM on the other. Significant part



of posts were sponsored, which made it possible to deliver confusing and discrediting messages to a broad audience.

Pages that aimed to confuse and disorganize voters became active ahead of the second round.

With regard to voter awareness, especially damaging were pages that pretended to support a particular candidate. These pages nearly did not exist in the first round. Such pages used names and logos of a candidate or a party that nominated/supported the candidate and on the surface they did not look any different from official campaign pages. However, based on the in-depth analysis of posts, their comparison to posts published by other pages, study of level and frequency of sponsored posts identified, it became clear that in reality these pages were targeting the very subjects in the name of which they seemingly operated. These pages often disseminated controversial posts. Activity of false supporting pages aimed to have their messages perceived as a position of subjects in the name of which they operated, which would have discredited them. ISFED found 7 such pages operating against Grigol Vashadze and 1 against Salome Zurabishvili.

Following the first round of the election, pages spreading ultra-nationalist narratives became active on Facebook in favor of Salome Zurabishvili. Prior to that, majority of these pages were actively disseminating posts with xenophobic, homophobic and anti-liberal contents. Activity of these pages also entailed attempts to discredit observer organizations, which became especially active after a public statement was made by observer organizations about possible printing of fake ID cards.

Pages of presidential candidates, parties that nominated/endorsed them and official campaign pages on Facebook mostly operated in abidance by requirements of the law.

From October 10 to December 2, activity of official Facebook pages of electoral subjects and parties that endorsed them was mostly limited to advertising their platforms, criticizing competitors and publishing electoral promises. Homophobic and xenophobic rhetoric and hate speech was detected on Facebook pages of certain candidates that participated in the first round, however no such campaign was found on official campaign pages of Grigol Vashadze and Salome Zurabishvili, who competed in the second round. Notably, candidates and parties essentially did not use their official social media pages for discrediting opponents. In addition, based on the analysis of posts published on these pages, presidential candidates did not violate the rules of pre-election campaigning.

The Georgian Dream made illegal donation in favor of Salome Zurabishvili using their official Facebook page. P/u *Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia* published sponsored posts on its official page, openly expressing their support for the independent presidential candidate Salome Zurabishvili. In addition, some of the sponsored posts published on the party website represented campaigning against Grigol Vashadze and the UNM. Expenses made for sponsored posts amounts to illegal donation in favor of Salome Zurabishvili and is against the organic law of Georgia on Political Associations of Citizens.

Notably, Giorgi Vashadze, who managed Grigol Vashadze's campaign, and Zaal Udumashvili published a number of sponsored posts on their official Facebook pages, which should be disclosed as a donation made in favor of the UNM in a declaration submitted to the State Audit Office. Otherwise, it will amount to illegal donation.

Instances of misuse of administrative resources during the pre-election period were not found on official Facebook pages of municipalities and Ajara A/R bodies. The only exception is the official page of Tianeti Municipality, which published one campaign post. ISFED filed a complaint in connection to the violation and a protocol of administrative violation was subsequently issued against the responsible civil servant. ISFED welcomes that number of posts published by official Facebook pages of municipalities did not change during the campaign period for both the first and the second round of the presidential election and their activity remained stable.

Local self-government employees (civil servants) often violated the Election Code by campaigning during working hours using social media.

Similar to the trend identified in the first interim report of social media monitoring, civil servants continued to actively participate in campaigning during the second round, in favor of the candidate endorsed by the ruling party and against the opposition candidate. During the second reporting period covering the official election campaign for both the first and the second round of the election, ISFED identified violation of campaigning rules during working hours by a total of **62 civil servants in 30 municipalities.**

IV. OFFICIAL FACEBOOK PAGES OF CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

To observe social media activity of electoral subjects and parties that nominated or endorsed them, ISFED monitored 19 official Facebook pages of main presidential candidates, political parties that have nominated/endorsed them and official campaign pages on Facebook.¹ As of December 14, these pages have been liked by a total of **1,261,986** Facebook users and from June 1 to December 14, they published **7,224** posts, including **1,483** posts published during the period from October 25 to December 2.

For this report, monitoring of official pages of presidential candidates and parties that support/endorse them was carried out from October 10 to December 2.

Majority of candidates and parties were disseminating their political visions and platforms on Facebook and most of this activity did not contain any illegal actions or promises, with the only exception of illegal donation made by the *Georgian Dream* in favor of Salome Zurabishvili.

During the pre-election period of the runoff, unlike the first round, p/u *Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia* conducted direct and indirect campaign in favor of the independent candidate Salome Zurabishvili using sponsored posts on its official Facebook page.

By placing advertisement with political contents in favor of the independent candidate, the *Georgian Dream* violated para.1”c” of art.26 of the organic law of Georgia on Political Associations of Citizens, which prohibits receiving donation from a political party.

From October 29 to November 27, 14 sponsored posts were published on the official Facebook page of the *Georgian Dream*, including:

- 4 posts regarding the initiative of the Government of Georgia to write-off loans for 600,000 citizens;
- 4 posts about new social and infrastructural projects initiated by the Government of Georgia;
- 4 posts were an advertisement with political contents, directed against the *United National Movement* and the former government;
- 2 posts were an appeal to voters to support Salome Zurabishvili.

13 sponsored posts were published on the [official page](#) of Salome Zurabishvili’s campaign during the period between the first and the second round. Majority of these posts concerned meetings held within the campaign of Zalome Zurabishvili and advertisement of her programs. One of the sponsored posts concerned criticism of Mikheil Saakashvili by Salome Zurabishvili due to his anti-Semitic announcement and 2 posts concerned threats made against Salome Zurabishvili and her family members.

Interestingly, the official campaign page of Salome Zurabishvili did not publish information about the initiative of the ruling party to write off loans of 600,000 citizens on the “black list”. In addition, the posts did not concern new social and infrastructural projects initiated by the ruling party during the pre-election period.

On the [official page](#) of Grigol Vashadze, 30 sponsored posts were published during the period between the first and the second round, including 28 posts concerning Grigol Vashadze’s campaign activity and his programs. Two posts were directed against the *Georgian Dream* government.

¹ Facebook pages of the Georgian Dream and Salome Zurabishvili: [ქართული ოცნება/Georgian Dream; სალომე - პრეზიდენტად / Salome Zourabichvili; სალომე ზურაბიშვილი / Salome Zourabichvili;](#)

Facebook pages of the European Georgia and Davit Bakradze: [ევროპული საქართველო - მოძრაობა თავისუფლებისთვის; დავით ბაქრაძე -David Bakradze](#)

Facebook pages of the UNM, Grigol Vashadze, the united opposition Power in Unity and its members: [ერთიანი ნაციონალური მოძრაობა; Gregory Vashadze / გრიგოლ ვაშაძე; ძალა ერთობაშია / Strength in Unity; ახალი საქართველო; ეროვნულ დემოკრატიული პარტია National Democratic Party of Georgia](#)

Facebook pages of Girchi and Zurab Japaridze: [Zurab Japaridze; გირჩი / Girchi](#)

Facebook pages of Free Democrats, Development Movement and Davit Usupashvili: [თავისუფალი დემოკრატები / Free Democrats; შენგის მოძრაობა • Development Movement; David Usupashvili Official](#)

Facebook pages of Free Georgia and Kakha Kukava: [Kakha Kukava / კახა კუკავა; თავისუფალი საქართველო;](#)

Facebook pages of Labor Party and Shalva Natelashvili: [ლეიბორისტული პარტია • Labour Party; Shalva Natelashvili - შალვა ნათელაშვილი](#)

In addition to Grigol Vashadze, other opposition politicians were also active on their Facebook pages. Head of Grigol Vashadze campaign headquarters – Giorgi Vashadze published sponsored political posts in favor of Grigol Vashadze on his official Facebook page, which are not reflected in the declaration of campaign donations made in favor of Grigol Vashadze.

Additionally, some of the sponsored posts published on the official Facebook page of the leader of the UNM Zaal Udumashvili were directed against Salome Zurabishvili and contained negative rhetoric. The candidate was often referred to as a “traitor” and “cultureless”. In view of high level of engagement of Facebook users in these posts, significant majority of the posts was probably sponsored.

V. ACTIVITY OF OFFICIAL FACEBOOK PAGES OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

To detect misuse of administrative resources or any possible violations through social networks, ISFED monitored **98** Facebook pages of city halls and assemblies (Sakrebulo) of all local self-government municipalities as well as bodies of Adjara A/R government. This report covers the period of monitoring from October 19 to December 2.

As a result of monitoring, ISFED did not find any connection between the activity of official Facebook pages of municipalities and the electoral processes. Activity dynamic of these pages is stable and it has not increased during the pre-election campaign of the first or the second round of the election.

In the period between the first and the second round of the presidential election, spike in activity of the local self-government pages was found on November 23. Analysis of the published posts reveals that the increased activity is related to the celebration of St. George’s Day and congratulatory posts related to it.

ISFED welcomes the fact that official websites of local self-governments disseminated information about municipality work and activities, with the aim of informing local citizens, and these pages were not used in favor of or against any of the electoral subjects.

It is also positive that the municipality pages did not disseminate reports about political party activities or any type of information posted by them.

The only exception was Tianeti Municipality site, which shared a post published on the personal page of Tianeti Municipality Mayor Tamaz Mechiauri, declaring his support for Salome Zurabishvili in the second round. ISFED filed a complaint with the electoral administration over the misuse of administrative resources and demanded drawing up of a protocol of violation. Tianeti DEC shared ISFED’s arguments and declared that publishing of a political post on the official page of the municipality amounted to an administrative violation. The court examined the report of violation and found that administrative violation had been committed. It subsequently issued a reproof against the person responsible for administering the Facebook page of the municipality.

VI. MONITORING OF PERSONAL FACEBOOK PROFILES OF CIVIL SERVANTS

To identify instances of participation of civil servants in campaigning by social media, ISFED continued to monitor personal Facebook profiles of civil servants employed by local self-governments, during the pre-election period of the first round as well as after the official campaign began for the second round of the election. This report covers the period from October 5 to October 28 during the electoral period of the first round; for the second round of the election, monitoring of social media activity by civil servants was carried out after the pre-election campaign officially began, from November 15 to November 27. The monitoring scope included Facebook profiles of **676** civil servants. Instances of campaigning by civil servants were detected both during and outside of working hours.

From October 5 to October 28 and from November 15 to November 27, ISFED identified instances of illegal campaigning through Facebook by a total of **62 civil servants in 30 municipalities**.

During the first round electoral campaign, from on October 5-27, campaigning rules during work hours were violated on Facebook by 36 civil servants of 25 municipalities. Among presidential candidates cases of campaigning were found only in favor of Salome Zurabishvili. As to other candidates, they were targeted by discrediting messages. Most of such discrediting posts were directed against Grigol Vashadze. Fewer instances of campaigning against Davit Bakradze were found.

During the second round campaign, instances of illegal campaigning by civil servants during working hours were found in 23 municipalities. Number of civil servants that posted campaign material of electoral subjects at least once during working hours was 38. Some of these civil servants also were campaigning before the first round. The campaigning was in favor of Salome Zurabishvili and/or against Grigol Vashadze and the UNM.

During the second round campaign, 67 civil servants in 33 municipalities engaged in campaigning during non-working days and hours. These civil servants also include those who campaigned during working hours. Frequency of publishing and sharing posts that contained campaign materials far exceeded the number of posts published during working hours.

Para. 8 of Article 2 of the Election Code of Georgia defines campaigning as “appeal to voters in favor of or against an electoral subject/candidate, as well as any public action facilitating or impeding its election and/or containing signs of election campaign, including the participation in organization/conduct of pre-electoral events, preservation or dissemination of election materials, work on the list of supporters, presence in the representations of political parties.” Under para. 4 of art. 45 of the Election Code of Georgia, civil servants of central and local authorities are prohibited from conducting and participating in election campaigning during working hours.



The restriction placed on civil servants in terms of conducting and participating in pre-election campaigning is based on the principles of the Law of Georgia on Civil Service, requiring civil servants to abide by the principle of impartiality and political neutrality. A civil servant is prohibited from using his/her official status for advancing party (political) goals and/or interests, to participate in election campaign during working hours and/or while performing his/her official duties. In addition, according to the OSCE Copenhagen Document, which underlines the need to draw a line between the state and a political party, party activities should not be mixed with activities of the state.

VII. DISCREDITING PAGES ON FACEBOOK

During the pre-election period of the second round, anonymous pages that aimed to discredit candidates, parties that nominated and endorsed them, leaders, politically active individuals as well as active and ongoing political processes in general, continued to exist on Georgian Facebook.

The present chapter summarizes results of monitoring of activity of discrediting pages during the period from October 19 to December 2. Since the previous reporting period, number and activity of these pages has significantly grown. During the monitoring, ISFED detected 160 discrediting pages on Facebook and monitors their activity. Until October 19, ISFED knew only about 54 discrediting pages.

Out of 160 anonymous discrediting pages studied:

- 43 targeted Salome Zurabishvili and *Georgian Dream* - the party that endorsed her;
- 72 waged discrediting campaign against Grigol Vashadze, the party that nominated him – the UNM and the united opposition, Rustavi 2, as well as political leaders and parties that endorsed Grigol Vashadze for the second round;
- 8 pages operated as platforms pretending to support one of the candidates while in reality, the support was false and evidently, these pages aimed to discredit the very candidates that they pretended to support. Seven of them discredited Grigol Vashadze while posing as a page that supported him. One page was targeting Salome Zurabishvili.
- 19 pages operated as fake media outlets that expressed their support for the government and Salome Zurabishvili on the one hand and on the other hand, they discredited Vashadze and political forces that supported him.
- 23 ultra-nationalist pages most of which were spreading anti-western, anti-liberal narratives prior to the election period, became active ahead of the second round and started publishing political posts. Majority of these posts targeted Grigol Vashadze and the UNM, supported Salome Zurabishvili but rarely also criticized the *Georgian Dream*.

Compared to the pre-election period of the first round, number of discrediting pages tripled. Large-scale sponsoring of posts was used to instill and manage public attitudes and to spread discrediting reports about candidates targeted during the election period.

Some of these pages were divided into two main camps during the period between the first and the second round. Some tried to discredit Salome Zurabishvili and the *Georgian Dream* by spreading damaging reports, while others aimed to discredit Grigol Vashadze, the UNM, the united opposition and openly oppositional TV channel – Rustavi 2. The main message of these pages was to portray Grigol Vashadze as an extension of the former government and its violent regime.

During the period between the first and the second round, pages that posed as news agencies became active. They operated using a new strategy and pretended to cover political processes in the country while clearly disseminating pro-governmental news and reports targeting Grigol Vashadze and the UNM. Indirect support of Salome Zurabishvili was evident in these posts. Significant majority of the posts were sponsored.

After the first round, 10 new pages that posed as news agencies were created, however previously existing pages also became active using the same strategy. Within the monitoring ISFED studied 19 fake news agency pages. Their posts had similar contents and significant majority of these posts were sponsored.

After the first round of the election, a few other pages also became active posing as supporters of Grigol Vashadze and the united opposition. However, contents of their sponsored posts clearly indicate that these pages aimed to discredit Grigol Vashadze while pretending to be his supporters. Similar strategy was used by one Facebook page that targeted Salome Zurabishvili but it did not publish sponsored posts.



Some pages that spread anti-western and anti-liberal narratives became involved in political campaigning after the first round, as the pre-election period of the second round began. These pages published posts in support of Salome Zurabishvili and against Grigol Vashadze.

7.1. Pages targeting Salome Zurabishvili and the Georgian Dream


ISFED monitored a total of 43 pages on Facebook with the aim of discrediting Salome Zurabishvili and the *Georgian Dream*. These pages are liked by a total of 721,646 Facebook users. From October 29 to December 2, 8,383 posts were published on these pages. ISFED found that among these posts 28 were sponsored.

Pages that operate against Zurabishvili and the *Georgian Dream* were most active after the first round. After the first round, number of pages that aimed to discredit Zurabishvili and the ruling party that endorsed her grew. However, the growth was not at the expense of newly created pages but was mostly attributable to pages that already existed, but were not visible on Facebook due to low level of activity. Two new pages were also created during this time: “Salome the Traitor” and “Live Georgia”.

During the second reporting period, before and after the first round, pages discrediting the candidate endorsed by the ruling party continued to be especially active. They published many posts, however sponsored posts on these pages were fewer than on the pages that discredited the opposition candidate. Sponsored posts were found on 6 pages only and mostly on pages titled “Official Agency for Mocking the Georgian Dream” and “Resident Salome”.



“Official Agency for Mocking the Georgian Dream” is especially active among pages that target Salome Zurabishvili and the Georgian Dream. The highest number of posts was published on this page during the Election Day period. After the first round of the election on October 28, the page published 194 posts, and during the second round on November 28, it published 160 posts. Posts originally published by this page were often shared by other pages that discredit Zurabishvili.



Activity of pages that discredit Salome Zurabishvili and the Georgian Dream from June 1 to December 2: dynamics of the number of posts (in blue) and their ratings (in orange). The chart also shows the dates when the elections were called, the campaign officially began and each round of the election was held.


Main messages of the Official Agency for Mocking the Georgian Dream on October 19-28 included: legalization of marijuana, the plan for cultivating hemp for export and connecting this to Bidzina Ivanishvili. Other high-profile topics that were frequently used included submission of Salome Zurabishvili’s book as evidence to the International Court of Justice and the presidential candidate’s poor command of Georgian language.

Following the first round of the election, messages about ties of Salome Zurabishvili to Russia and Vladimir Putin continued to be used. Posts also concerned other topics, including:

- Infrastructural projects implemented when the UNM was in power;
- Tragedies told by Zaza Saralidze and Malkhaz Machalikashvili;
- Statement made by Zurabishvili in the past against Zviad Gamsakhurdia;
- Distribution of potatoes in Gardabani Municipality in exchange for voting for Salome Zurabishvili, and more.

One of the important aspects of the campaign against Salome Zurabishvili on Facebook was statements made by the clergy. On October 22, a sermon of Chkondidi Bishop His Holiness Petre against Salome Zurabishvili was published on October 22. According to the bishop, Zurabishvili referred to Abkhazia and Tskhinvali as “gangrene”, which was anti-state action. He urged voters not to mark Salome Zurabishvili on their ballots, despite the pressure that they may experience. He stated that voting for Zurabishvili equals to treason. A [video](#) published by a Facebook page “Power in People” about this topic had over 11,000 shares. In mid-November, His Holiness Petre made another statement saying that any honest person in Zurabishvili’s place would have withdrawn their candidacy. His statement was actively shared by pages that discredited the candidate endorsed by the government.

In mid-November, pages that discredit Salome Zurabishvili started a campaign “No to Salome”. In videos published by these pages former military servicemen explained why they would not vote for Zurabishvili. They said that Georgia did not start the war in 2008, they referred to Salome as a traitor and suggested that her victory would be damaging to the country.



On November 19, when the government announced the initiative to write off bank loans, Facebook page titled Resident Salome published a manipulated photo suggesting that on her official Facebook page Salome Zurabishvili confronted the *Georgian Dream* about the initiative. The post was shared by other pages as well, including the Official Agency for Mocking the Georgian Dream. Later, promises made by Bidzina Ivanishvili in 2012 that were not fulfilled became an active topic. Main message was that Ivanishvili’s promises would not be fulfilled this time either.















In the last week of November, a trend of manipulation with Salome Zurabishvili’s personal life became evident on discrediting pages. Zurabishvili’s family was targeted by the negative campaign. In addition, xenophobic messages

appeared about background of his son Teimuraz Gorjestan and photo manipulations were spread about him that were mostly sarcastic.

The Official Agency for Mocking the Georgian Dream posted two videos on November 13 and 26, alleging that Bidzina Ivanishvili and his family were “satanic”. The first video suggests ties between Bidzina Ivanishvili and “statistic” rituals and symbols. According to the [video](#), the *Georgian Dream* logo and the shape of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s residence coincides with satanic pictograms, and his son was allegedly named after the last king of Sodom. The video also suggests that Bidzina Ivanishvili had something to do with Barbare Rapaliantsi’s tragic story, alleging that this was a ritual murder used in the Ancient Carthage to attract more money. The [video](#) published on

November 26 contains similar messages. In the video, a person who refers to himself as Bidzina Ivanishvili’s former advisor and “shaman” says that Ivanishvili hired him before he began working in Russia, in order to control his employees. Later he became interested in ritual murders. The video shows the shape of his residence alleging that it looks like a satanic symbol. Feedback of Facebook users (mostly in the comments section) about the videos and their creators is negative but some users agree with their message.

Following the second round of the election, posts published on websites that target Zurabishvili and the party that endorsed her mostly focused on electoral violations, vote buying and intimidation of voters during the pre-election period and possible printing of fake ID cards. Different pages including Resident Salome also published Salome Zurabishvili’s photo with the following inscription: “I did not vote for her” and a video captioned “I don’t have a president.”




 PAGES THAT STARTED DISCREDITING SALOME ZURABISHVILI AFTER THE FIRST ROUND 		
DATE OF CREATION	NAME OF THE PAGE	PAGE LIKES
04.01.2010	 Georgia	59,906
08.01.2011	 United Uni United National Movement	26,288
11.10.2012	 Dreamland	1,993
03.06.2013	 Georgia of Georgian Dream	35,328
23.10.2014	 Movement for the future of Georgia	19,597
08.03.2015	 Assgiver	1,130
24.03.2015	 Down with Bidzina Ivanishvili	2,991
30.04.2015	 Georgian Dream is a killer	1,272
23.05.2015	 Misha, Come Back!	33,871
23.05.2015	 City full of Corruption	4,888
29.10.2015	 DGream	2,110
02.03.2018	 Poverty Hurts	12,840
02.03.2018	 Stink Bug	17,454
10.03.2018	 Bidzina Ivanishvili	2,703
03.04.2018	 Alter Ego	10,196
09.08.2018	 Salome Zurabishvili is a Russian Spy and an enemy of Georgia	81
30.09.2018	 Traitor Salome Zurabishvili is a Kremlin Spy	53

7.2. Pages targeting Grigol Vashadze and the UNM

ISFED found 72 pages on Facebook that operate to discredit Grigol Vashadze and the UNM. They have a total of 712,924 subscribers. During the period from October 29 to December 2, these pages published 3,164 posts, including 282 sponsored posts.

In the first interim report of social media monitoring, number of pages targeting Grigol Vahadze and the UNM did not significantly differ from the number of pages operating against Salome Zurabishvili and the *Georgian Dream*.² Following the first round, number of pages that discredit Grigol Vashadze significantly grew. New pages were created targeting Grigol Vashadze, the UNM and people associated with them. These pages published large number of

sponsored posts. New pages appeared in the social network from November 1. On November 1-15, 24 new pages were created and 21 other pages that already existed became active for discrediting purposes. Consequently, as of December 2, 72 pages were engaged in anonymous smear campaign against Grigol Vashadze, whereas during the pre-election period of the first round, number of such pages was 27. On October 28 and 29, there was low level of activity of Facebook pages that discredit Vashadze, almost no new posts were published, however these pages became active after the initial results of the election were made public on October 30-31.



Activity of pages that discredit Grigol Vashadze and the UNM in the period from June 1 to December 2: dynamics of the number of posts (in blue) and their ratings (in orange). The chart also shows the dates when the elections were called, the campaign officially began and the election was held.


² First interim report of social media monitoring, pp.14-18; <http://www.isfed.ge/main/1429/geo/>

The newly created pages had similar strategy. Pages were created on a daily basis and immediately they published several sponsored posts against Vashadze and the UNM. Notably, posts published by newly created pages used high quality multimedia – video and photo materials.

Notably, same post was published by different pages with short time intervals as an original post of the page. Their titles contained same messages phrased differently. Such organized nature and identical strategy suggests that these groups were closely inter-related and organized.

Discrediting pages disseminated similar information in a specific period of time. For instance, on November 4-5, 6 different pages published posts with identical homophobic content. Posts published on November 6-7 contained photos and videos of violence during dispersal of the November 7, 2007 rally when the UNM was in power. These posts suggested that former high-level officials of the UNM were perpetrators of violence. At the same time, different types of manipulated photos were published to discredit Grigol Vashadze, with the aim of identifying him with former high-level officials of the UNM.

On November 16, a social media campaign began to demonstrate that by electing Vashadze, voters were in fact electing former high-level officials of the UNM. Later on November 21, these posters were placed on billboards in the streets of Tbilisi. Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze said that the posters had been placed by private sector, while the City Hall helped them deal with technical problems.



Interestingly, in early November a page titled [Apolitical Army](#) was created. The page should be viewed as a response to involvement of former high-level military officials in electoral campaign against Salome Zurbashvili and in favor of Grigol Vashadze, because posts published by this site concern this campaign. In particular, out of 15 posts 13 were sponsored. Even though the page has been liked by 1,729 Facebook users, the posts had a total of 8,235 shares and 18,773 reactions. Contents of these posts were similar – video statements made by former military servicemen and parents of soldiers that had died condemned degrading remarks about the woman candidate. They also severely criticized involvement of former soldiers in politics and said that their use by the UNM for political purposes is unacceptable.

After the *Georgian Republic Party* openly endorsed Grigol Vashadze's candidacy, a new page was created on Facebook titled "[Levan the Magnanimous](#)", directed against Levan Berdzenishvili and other members of the Republican Party. In addition, these pages started disseminating homophobic and transphobic posts to discredit the Republican Party. They also disseminated posts suggesting that the Republican Party was the force that fought against the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchy.


Interestingly, a Facebook page was also created against former Minister of Defense Irakli Orkuashvili, after he publicly endorsed Grigol Vashadze. The page titled "[Principled](#)" soon stopped operating and it has currently been deactivated, however posts that it published were sponsored.

After the first round, ultra-nationalistic sites became politically active against Grigol Vashadze and parties that endorsed him. Prior to that, main activity of these sites was dissemination of xenophobic, nationalistic, anti-liberal and anti-western posts.


Main messages of posts published by discrediting pages include:


















- Vashadze's caricatures and humorous photo manipulations, in order to identify Vashadze with Saakashvili;
- Short video bits produced by POST TV with #NotoMisha hashtag. In these reports respondents are talking about their hard experience when the UNM was in power. They suggest that the UNM regime was unfair and cruel;
- Photo and video materials of the dispersal of rally and the raid on Imedi TV on November 7, 2007. Notably, majority of posts posted on November 7 were sponsored.

- Discrediting of Rustavi 2 and Nika Gvaramia, and humorous representation of his escape from the country due to results of the election;
- Comments made by Grigol Vashadze following his meeting with the Patriarch, indicating that he misinterpreted the Patriarch's words;
- Information about involvement of Russian PR technologist Vitali Shkliarov in Grigol Vashadze's campaign, in order to suggest that Vashadze has ties with Russia;
- Statement of Mikheil Saakashvili about conduct of military operations in 2008, as a response of criticism of Salome Zurbishvili due to her statement that Georgia started the war;
- Posts about confirmation of authenticity of secret recording of a conversation between Mikheil Saakashvili and Temur Alasania;
- Humorous posts about the united opposition rally held on December 2 and humorous portrayal of participants of the rally.



PAGES THAT STARTED DISCREDITING GRIGOL VASHADZE AFTER THE FIRST ROUND



DATE OF CREATION	NAME OF THE PAGE	PAGE LIKES
18.12.2012	 It's time for truth	2,610
06.08.2013	 For	79,485
19.01.2014	 Catalizator	48,732
09.02.2015	 I don't want UNM, I'm fed up	110
09.07.2016	 Terenti from Gldani	24,515
09.07.2017	 Portirebuladze	38,986
31.07.2017	 Jerkenberg	7,234
01.05.2018	 Strange	1,184
30.06.2018	 Political measurement	964
20.08.2018	 Highly rated parties and leaders	2,218
04.09.2018	 He said	416
04.09.2018	 Unknown vaccine	448
20.09.2018	 Runaway President	1,380
28.09.2018	 We remember bloody Nazi regime	23
10.10.2018	 Nazis of our country	1,330
15.10.2018	 RusShit 2	1,238
18.10.2018	 Compare it	3,642



FACEBOOK PAGES DISCREDITING GRIGOL VASHADZE AND UNM CREATED AFTER THE FIRST ROUND




DATE OF CREATION	NAME OF THE PAGE	NUMBER OF POSTS	INTERACTIONS			
			TOTAL	SHARE	COMMENT	REACTION
31.10.2018	No to Misha	35	541	128	89	324
01.11.2018	2012	12	10,278	8,051	266	1,961
02.11.2018	Mikheil the Tramp	6	36	14	0	22
02.11.2018	Levan the Kind	12	1,379	679	76	624
03.11.2018	I protect freedom	39	46,520	5,646	4,722	36,152
04.11.2018	Person of Principle	4	1,229	98	62	1,069
05.11.2018	People's movement - No to Nazizm	52	14,344	4,044	1,058	9,242
05.11.2018	No roses out there	5	191	40	55	96
05.11.2018	NotoMisha	56	134	71	2	61
06.11.2018	GPO - pre-election monitoring	17	7,749	563	1,967	5,219
06.11.2018	Club of Young Politologists	50	30,346	6,209	3,783	20,354
06.11.2018	Analytics - analytical center facto meter	47	21,679	3,929	3,402	14,348
06.11.2018	Propaganda of Perversion	56	14,635	2,467	2,660	9,508
06.11.2018	Civil union - people's voice	30	21,116	4,855	4,008	12,253
06.11.2018	Unity of Georgians - Iberia	33	21,813	4,155	3,315	14,379
06.11.2018	Stockholm syndrome	28	34,459	7,456	4,695	22,308
07.11.2018	Real Side	16	454	143	24	287
10.11.2018	Never to the Nazi Gang	1	0	0	0	0
12.11.2018	May I be the Nazi	1	0	0	0	0
13.11.2018	People's Voice	24	431	119	74	238
13.11.2018	I don't vote for violence	30	7,465	2,567	1,284	3,614
14.11.2018	No to Misha	1	0	0	0	0
14.11.2018	Apolitical Army	15	28,321	8,235	1,313	18,773
14.11.2018	Antinacism	118	4,740	4,461	227	2
14.11.2018	Meskheta Gate	11	282	121	161	0
15.11.2018	They want two corpses	22	19,248	9,484	1,126	8,638
15.11.2018	Kutaisians, say no to the executioners	21	7,461	3,452	1,015	2,994
16.11.2018	TheyWillNotComeBack	395	8,570	4,510	3,988	72


7.3. Pages posing as supporters of a particular candidate, party or politician

ISFED detected 8 Facebook pages that pose as supporters of a particular candidate, party or current/former politician. Judging by their names and posts, these pages aim to be perceived as supporters of a particular candidate, party or current/former politician. However, analysis of post contents, degree of sponsored content and strategy of action clearly illustrates that in reality, they are targeting the very subjects in the name of which they operate.

6 out of 8 pages of false supporting pages were created in November, after the first round. Three of them (“Grigol Vashadze - United Headquarters”, “He who is not a Nazi [UNM supporter] is not a man”, “Freedom for Bacho”) were created the same day, on November 6. Seven pages posed as supporters of Grigol Vashadze, the UNM, Mikheil Saakashvili and former high-level officials of the government or opponents of Salome Zurabishvili as a female candidate. Unlike posts published by pages that in reality support Grigol Vashadze and the UNM, majority of posts published by the pages of false support were sponsored. 7 pages published a total of 10 sponsored posts on November 1-28.



1 page was posing to be run by a supporter of Salome Zurabishvili while in reality, it aimed to discredit the candidate. There were no sponsored posts on this page. At the end of the second round all of the said pages were deactivated.



Activity of false supporting pages from October 19 to December 2: dynamics of the number of posts (in blue) and their ratings (in orange).

While pages that aimed to support the UNM and Grigol Vashadze and discredit Salome Zurabishvili often published similar posts, no other pages published posts that corresponded to messages of sponsored posts by false supporting pages of the UNM and Grigol Vashadze.

Grigol Vashadze – United Headquarters created on November 6, started to operate by sharing posts published on the official Facebook page of Grigol Vashadze. In addition, on November 7, a photo-manipulation was published on the page, showing an image of an angel behind Vashadze. The caption of the photo referred to him as a “visible miracle” and “a sign of God”. The post also urged Facebook users to vote for Vashadze and share the posts. The post was

sponsored, and many Facebook users from Georgian had access to it. The post had over 11,000 reactions, 2,900 comments and up to 3,600 shares. The majority of feedback was sarcastic toward Vashadze.



On November 19, the page published another sponsored post condemning the PM’s initiative to write off bank loans. Notably, the majority of feedback was aggressive toward Vashadze and the UNM.



Page titled “He who is not a Nazi [UNM supporter] is not a man” urged voters to support Grigol Vashadze and the UNM. On November 7, it published a sponsored post justifying the Rustaveli Avenue rally crackdown on November 7, 2007. Participants of the rally were referred to by obscene words.




On November 6, a page posing as a supporter of the former Minister of Defense and Internal Affairs of Georgia, Bachana Akhalaia was created. In all of its posts the page announced that Akhalaia would be released from prison and suggested that the time remaining until the election was the time remaining until Akhalaia’s release from prison. Posts published by the page were sponsored. The majority of feedback was aggressive.

Main message of a page created on November 20, “Mikheil Saakashvili for President” was to show that the voters had to choose not between Grigol Vashadze and Salome Zurbashvili but between the latter and Mikheil Saakashvili. The site published sponsored posts and large numbers of both supporters and opponents of Mikheil Saakashvili reacted to these posts.




Some of the false supporting pages disseminated messages saying that a female presidential candidate was unacceptable. A video targeting Salome Zurabishvili as a female presidential candidate was posted by Association of Supporters of the United National Movement. Notably, publishing of the video was preceded by a statement of Salome Zurabishvili that she was targeted by opponents as a female candidate. The sole message of all posts published by the page “The Darkest of All” was the message that female presidential candidate was unacceptable.



Another page that posed as a supporter of Mikheil Saakashvili and the UNM was operating under the name “New Government – Forward to Success”. The page posted a false report saying that Saakashvili had pledged that Georgia would have a new government starting from the New Year. The page also published posts reporting that Giorgi Vashadze would be the new Prime Minister of Georgia. In the “new government” Vano Merabishvili would hold the office of the Interior Minister and Devi Chankotadze would hold the office of the Minister of Defense. Each poster was captioned: “New Year – New Government!”

ISFED also detected a Facebook page that posed as a supporter of Salome Zurabishvili. Name of the page (სალომე ზურაბიშვილი / Salome Zourabichvili) was similar to the name of the official page of Zurabishvili (Salome Zourabichvili / სალომე ზურაბიშვილი). The profile photo on false supporting page was the same as the profile photo on the official page of the candidate. The page was created before the first round, on October 3. Initially it mostly shared posts published by official pages of Salome Zurabishvili and the *Georgian Dream*. On November 19, the page shared the Russian national flag accompanied with an announcement that Russia was the presidential candidate’s choice and it was a friend not an occupant. Similar to other posts of the page, this particular post was not sponsored and therefore, it did not get much feedback.




7.4. Fake media pages

During the pre-election period and especially after the first round, fake news agency pages became especially active. On the surface it looked like they were covering political processes in the country but in reality, they purposefully published posts in favor of the government and against Grigol Vashadze and the UNM. Indirect support of Salome Zurbashvili was also evident in these posts. After the first round, 10 new fake media pages were created and pre-existing ones became active. Through the monitoring ISFED detected a total of 19 fake media pages. Their contents are similar and their posts are often sponsored.



Such pages pose as online news agencies, as suggested by their names and profile photos that look like a news agency logo. They also try to imitate other real media outlets – e.g. a page titled Meskhetis Karibche is an imitation of a news agency Samkhretis Karibche.

Such fake media pages became especially active during the pre-election period of the first round is confirmed by dynamics of their activity identified by ISFED monitoring.




Activity of fake media outlet pages from June 1 to December 10 - dynamics of the number of posts (in blue) and their ratings (in orange).


On November 19, majority of pages studied by ISFED, shared and sponsored a number of posts concerning the government initiative to write off debts for blacklisted people. The news was shared in a positive light, with a headline “Congratulations! Over 600,000 people will have a debt-free New Year”. The posts underlined that the initiative was unveiled by PM Mamuka Bakhtadze as early as in August. Some of the posts published about this topic aimed to portray the UNM in a negative light.



These pages also shared sponsored posts about discussions on the election campaign in Georgia in the European Parliament. They published remarks made by Victor Bostinaru, according to which former Russian ambassador and a candidate of the UNM may not be acceptable as a president of Georgia.




Fake media pages published comments of Giorgi Vashadze about universal healthcare, where he talked about importance of prevention. His out of context quote was used as a title: “We are pouring money into a black hole because we are providing treatment for people that are dying.”



Notably a report with the same title was also published on the official Facebook page of the Public Broadcaster. In connection to this, Grigol Vashadze filed a complaint against the GPN reporter in the Charter of Journalistic Ethics. The Charter found violation of journalistic ethics principles for dissemination of information out of context.

Significant majority of posts published by these websites aimed to portray Grigol Vashadze as pro-Russian and the UNM as a violent regime.



7.5. Activity of ultra-nationalist pages during the pre-election period

Following the first round of the election, pages that disseminate ultra-nationalist narratives also became active in political context. These pages tend to share nationalist, homophobic and anti-liberal posts. Usually contents shared by these pages are general and they are not limited to social and political developments in Georgia. However, during the pre-election period the pages became political/electoral as they became actively involved in the campaigning.

After the first round, ISFED identified **23** Facebook pages that became active within the electoral context. They have a total of **300,827** likes. Notably, these pages became especially active after the first round. During this time, 4 new such pages were created and some posts that they published were sponsored. Contents of posts published by pages studied within the monitoring are not identical, however their general views and tactics are similar.

Before the first round of the election, the pages studied by ISFED rarely discredited Grigol Vashadze, the UNM and the *Georgian Dream*; instead, they actively waged a negative campaign against *Girchi* and Zurab Japaridze. They published posts against him. This was mostly due to liberal views of *Girchi* and especially their advocacy for cannabis legalization. Notably, during the pre-election period of the presidential election, nationalist pages openly declared their support for presidential candidate Giorgi Andriadze, due to his anti-liberal views, and published posts in his support.



After the first round ended, ultra-nationalist pages started publishing posts against the *Georgian Dream*, stressing that they lost due to the liberal policies of the government. These posts were marked by their xenophobic, homophobic and anti-liberal contents. Starting from November 1, when the so-called *Georgian March* endorsed Salome Zurbashvili in the second round, these pages nearly stopped publishing posts against the *Georgian Dream*. Instead, they started publishing posts that supported Salome Zurbashvili, which did not happen during the pre-election period of the first round.

These pages were actively reporting about the government initiative to write off bank loans for “blacklisted individuals”. Different pages published three sponsored posts about this topic. Titles of these posts suggested pro-governmental attitude as well as an attempt to discredit the UNM with regard to this topic.

Notably, several ultra-nationalist groups removed their political posts as soon as the election ended. Many of these posts were sponsored during the pre-election period. These are the following pages: “Propaganda of Debauchery”, “Civil Association People’s Voice” and “the Righteous”.

DATE OF CREATION	NAME OF THE PAGE	PAGE LIKES
21.04.2012	Iveron	15,698
02.03.2016	National Conservative Analytics	9,680
28.12.2016	Notorious Society	30,879
29.12.2016	Geo Pepe	23,746
29.06.2017	Capital City	27,628
06.09.2017	Georgian March	17,418
17.01.2018	Resistance	13,084
21.01.2018	Nationality	9,429
28.02.2018	Lado Sadgobelashvili	6,426
23.04.2018	Nationalist's Page	6,512
18.05.2018	Ani-Paradox	18,149
19.05.2018	Uncovering Pseudo-Liberals	10,326
20.05.2018	Alpha Dominant	40,910
28.05.2018	True Man	2,500
28.05.2018	I am Christian	7,559
01.06.2018	Unofficial Conspiracies	3,970
15.06.2018	I wil Die for Georgia	9,019
23.07.2018	Kardhu	23,958
06.10.2018	You are Georgia	21,097

ANNEX I - List of civil servants engaged in campaigning on Facebook during work hours (indicating Municipalities of their employment)

Municipality	Number of illegal campaigning cases	Civil servants that violated campaigning rule
Abasha	1	Vera Jibladze – head of the unit for coordination of organizational and administrative activities of the city hall
Ambrolauri	1	Tsitsino Gogilidze – head of the city hall budget office
Akhalkalaki	1	Armen Marangozian – Deputy Mayor
Akhmeta	2	Badri Pilashvili – head of the service for coordination of activities of mayor’s representatives Levan Oniashvili – specialist of the service for property management and material support of the city hall
Baghdati	1	Nodari Ebanoidze – head of the office of Sakrebulo
Bolnisi	3	Papuna Mushkudiani – chief of staff of the mayor Konstantine Kordzadze – head of the city hall infrastructural service Buba Gobejishvili – deputy mayor
Borjomi	2	Marina Khujadze – head of the office of culture, sports and youth of the city hall Shota Gelashvili – specialist of the sports division of the city hall
Gardabani	1	Duniamal Gajiev – deputy mayor
Gurjaani	4	Magda Machavariani – head of the inspection division of the internal audit office of the city hall Kote Beridzishvili – head of the property management office of the city hall Simoni Kochorashvili – first deputy mayor Tinatin Bitsadze – chief of staff of Sakrebulo
Dmanisi	1	Badri Subari – first deputy mayor
Telavi	1	Soso Iagorashvili – head of the sports and youth affairs division of the city hall
Kaspi	2	Tea Khorbaladze – head of the office of monuments protection, education, sports and youth affairs of the city hall Dali Korkomashvili – first category lead specialist of the administrative office of the city hall
Lagodekhi	4	Mamuka Sulakvelidze – mayor’s representative in Ninigori Community Giorgi Mchedlishvili – head of the administrative office of the city hall Aleksi Chankotadze – deputy mayor Giorgi Mchedlishvili – head of the administrative office of the city hall
Lanchkhuti	2	Maguli Kunchulia – head of the administrative and procurement service of the city hall, chair of the civil servants’ trade union Sophio Chkhaidze – deputy head of the childcare center of Lanchkhuti
Mestia	1	Temur Kurdiani – deputy mayor
Ozurgeti	1	Natia Zedginidze – head of the public relations division of the city hall Tamar Dumbadze – head of the social and health affairs unit of the city

		hall
Samtredia	4	Nato Manjgaladze – head of the cultural office of the city hall Misha Lezhava – head of the public relations office of the city hall Levan Akhobadze – head of the social services of the city hall Ia Khoshtaria – head of the general division of the city hall
Senaki	1	Donara Alania – head of the financial/budgetary office
Sighnaghi	2	Khatuna Aghamonashvili – head of the culture, sports, education and youth service Boris Inashvili – inspector of architecture and construction
Tkibuli	1	Sophio Bochorishvili – deputy mayor
Keda	1	Davit Gogvadze – head of the first structural unit of the city hall – military registration and conscription service
Kvareli	3	Giorgi Lursmanashvili – head of the office of infrastructure, spatial arrangement, construction and architecture of the city hall Valeri Goksadze – head of the supervision office of the city hall Givi Chakhnashvili – head of the unit for coordination of mayor’s representatives
Shuakhevi	4	Omar Takidze – deputy mayor Amiran Khimshiashvili – head of the Sakrebulo administration Teimuraz Kiladze – head of the budgetary division of the city hall Pridon Davitadze – head of the youth affairs office of the city hall
Chkhorotsku	1	Zviad Grigolia – head of the administration office of the city hall
Khoni	1	Aleksandre Iobidze – head of the architectural office of the city hall
Khulo	3	Lasha Bolkvadze – deputy mayor Nadim Vasadze – head of the financial office of the city hall Badri Meladze – head of the office of education, culture, tourism, sports and youth affairs of the city hall
Rustavi	2	Lasha Chopliani – head of the first structural unit of the internal audit of the city hall Mikheil Tataradze – head of the first structural unit of the military registration and conscription
Poti	3	Inga Maskhulia – head of the administrative and procurements office of the city hall Pikria Migineishvili – head of the city hall procurement office Ani Kilasonia – head of the information, foreign and public relations unit
Kutaisi	1	Giorgi Iobashvili – deputy mayor
Tbilisi	7	Bezhan Khutsishvili – deputy Gamgebeli of Nadzaladevi District Irakli Andghuladze – deputy Gamgebeli of Nadzaladevi District Irma Zavrashvili – Gamgebeli of Didube District Beka Mikautadze – Gamgebeli of Gldani District Megi Kalatozi – Isani District Gamgeoba, representative of the head of Navtlughi district division - Gamgebeli Teimuraz Chachua – deputy head of Vake District Gamgebeli Maia Badashvili – head of the division for development of apartment owners’ associations, Gamgeoba of Nadzaladevi District