



# REPORT No 6

## Observation Mission of the Presidential Election in the Republic of Moldova of 01 November 2020

### ELECTION DAY

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*The responsibility for the view shared in this Report belongs to Promo-LEX Association and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of donors. If there are any discrepancies between the text in Romanian and its translation, the provisions formulated in Romanian shall prevail.*

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## Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	4
INTRODUCTION.....	5
I. POLLING STATIONS OPENING AND CLOSING.....	7
II. INCIDENTS OBSERVED DURING THE ELECTION DAY .....	9
III. RESULTS OF FINAL VOTE COUNTING BY PROMO-LEX.....	20
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	23
ANNEXES .....	24

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Polling Station (PS) Opening and Closing** According to Article 55 of the Electoral Code, on the election day voting shall take place from 07.00 am to 9.00 pm. All of PSs monitored by observers were declared open. About 9% of the monitored polling stations were opened with slight delays. The absolute majority of the observed polling stations (99%) were closed at 9.00 pm. At least seven polling stations (1%) were closed after 9.00 pm.

Promo-LEX OM highlights that almost half (43%) of all observed PSs are not heated during the cold season of the year. At least 12 observed PSs (2%) had insufficient lighting.

Besides, at least 186 observed PSs (24%) ignored the rule that during the vote counting, the ballot papers shall be presented to all participants in the counting process by one single member of the office.

**Incidents on the election day.** Once the information reported by STOs from PSs and by mobile teams were processed, a number of 481 incidents were analysed and published in press releases.

Promo-LEX OM expresses its concern regarding the 10 cases, at least, of intimidating observers or obstructing the free observation process in polling stations. Note that in at least two cases electoral officials, and in isolated cases police officers prevented the access of Promo-LEX observers after the latter notified some incidents in the respective polling stations.

Failure to observe COVID-19 protection and prevention measures were the most frequently reported incidents – 75 cases. In this context, we believe that it is necessary to add vote counting booths in some PSs in order to make the flow of voters more efficient, especially in the polling stations with a higher presence of voters. Other reported incidents included: taking a picture of the ballot papers and other violations of the secret of vote (59), organised transportation of voters (50), deficiencies in the operation of “Elections” SAIS (35), presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters in the area of the polling station (34) and errors in the lists of voters (29). A share of 74% of the reported cases of organised transportation of voters involve the transnistrian region.

Promo-LEX OM also draws attention to incidents related to: electioneering on the election day (14) and rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters (14). In addition, we signal an alarming situation that could affect the credibility of the electoral process, reported for PS 29/20 Soroca, Căinari Vechi, where the EOPS found that 200 unused ballot papers disappeared.

Compared with the Parliamentary elections of 24 February 2019 (the latest national election), we notice that the structure of the most frequently reported incidents remained unchanged: deficiencies in SAISE and in lists of voters, organised transportation of voters and violation of the secret of vote (including by taking pictures of the ballot papers).

**Final vote counting by Promo-LEX OM.** Promo-LEX OM analysed the accuracy of 2,135 Vote Counting Protocols in the presidential election of Moldova of the total of 2,135 protocols. A total of 53 errors were found in 27 protocols on the basis of verification formulae. The number of protocols with errors increases insignificantly if compared with the general local elections of 2019, but is lower if compared with the presidential election of 2016 and parliamentary election of 2019.

The results of parallel vote counting for the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova do not reveal any significant differences between the final data presented by CEC and final data obtained by Promo-LEX. However, Promo-LEX OM notices an increasing dynamic in the number of voters who cast their votes on the basis of lists of voters at their place of stay in the Republic of Moldova.

## INTRODUCTION

Report no 6 is compiled by Promo-LEX Observation Mission (OM) of the Presidential Election in the Republic of Moldova of 1 November 2020. The report contains the main findings with regards to opening and closing the polling stations, incidents noticed during the election day, as well as an analysis of parallel vote counting by Promo-LEX OM. The content of this document may be subject to editorial revisions.

The report was developed on the basis of findings reported by short-term observers (STO) via SMS. On the election day, Promo-LEX delegated one short-term observer (STO) in each of the 608 polling stations (PSs) selected by Promo-LEX OM from a sample established by a sociological company. Moreover, static observers were delegated to 52 polling stations, and to the 42 polling stations where the voters from the transnistrian region cast their votes. The electoral process in the polling stations, in their immediate vicinity, including on the access routes to the polling stations where the voters from the transnistrian region cast their votes, were also monitored by 80 mobile teams of observers.

All observers involved in the monitoring process were trained during the seminars organized by Promo-LEX Mission. They signed the Code of Conduct<sup>1</sup> of the Promo-LEX Independent National Observer, assuming the commitment to act efficiently, in good faith and in a non-partisan manner. Promo-LEX observers were also trained in protection standards in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The central team of the Association coordinates the activity of observers.

The OM Observation Report for the election day was developed on the basis of the STO findings, submitted in two special forms: periodic reporting form and incident reporting form. Observers sent their reports via SMS, which were stored on web platform [www.data.promolex.md](http://www.data.promolex.md) for further processing. The accumulated information was analysed by the Central Team and was presented in the form of press releases.

Promo-LEX Mission also manages the public web platform [www.electorala.monitor.md](http://www.electorala.monitor.md), which stored, on the election day, relevant information (including photo/video, with no personal data) from observers' reports. In addition, any individual had the possibility to upload on this platform their alerts about electoral activities.

Promo-LEX OM for Moldova Presidential Election of 1 November 2020 is a project implemented by Promo-LEX Association as part of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections. Promo-LEX OM is not a political opponent for the election contenders involved in the electoral process, it is not an investigation body and does not assume the express obligation to support its findings by evidence. Nonetheless, the observers' reports are accompanied, as much as possible, by photo and video evidence. These can be made available only to law enforcement bodies on the basis of proper requests and never to election contenders. At the same time, electoral authorities shall deal with the violations, including the alleged ones, presented in this report as prescribed in Article 22 (1)(q) and Article 68 (5) of the Electoral Code, treating them as observers' notifications to be reviewed according to their competence.

This report refers to the international standards developed by UN, OSCE, European Commission for Democracy through Law, European Union and Council of Europe. The preliminary recommendations for public and electoral authorities, election candidates/participants in referendum and other stakeholders are made at the end of this report in order to improve the electoral process.

The Mission is conducted and the report is developed with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) via the 'Democracy, Transparency and Accountability' Program, the Good Governance Department of Soros Foundation-Moldova under 'Monitoring the Presidential Elections of 1 November 2020' Project, and the Council of Europe under 'Support for civic observation of 2020 Presidential Election in polling stations abroad'. *'Hate speech' component is supported by Justice and Human Rights Department of Soros Foundation-Moldova under*

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<sup>1</sup> [Code of Conduct](#) of Promo-LEX National Independent Observer.

*'Consolidation of a platform for the development of activism and education in the area of human rights in Moldova – stage IV' Project.*

The opinions set out in the public reports and press releases of Promo-LEX OM are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the donors' view.

## I. POLLING STATIONS OPENING AND CLOSING

According to Article 55 of the Electoral Code, on the election day voting shall take place from 07.00 am to 9.00 pm. All of PSs monitored by observers were declared open. About 9% of the monitored polling stations were opened with slight delays. The absolute majority of the observed polling stations (99%) were closed at 9.00 pm. At least seven polling stations (1%) were closed after 9.00 pm.

Promo-LEX OM highlights that almost half (43%) of all observed PSs are not heated during the cold season of the year. At least 12 observed PSs (2%) had insufficient lighting.

Besides, at least 186 observed PSs (24%) ignored the rule that during the vote counting, the ballot papers shall be presented to all participants in the counting process by one single member of the office.

Promo-LEX observers monitored the procedures of opening polling stations, as well as their closure and vote counting in 783 PSs. At the same time, during the election day, the 80 mobile teams monitored the voting process in 1521 polling stations. In terms of methodology, note that the number of findings by areas could be different, depending on the text messages, received and validated by the central team<sup>2</sup>.

### 1.1. PS opening

All of the monitored polling stations were declared open. At the same time, eight polling stations (1%) were opened with a delay over 15 minutes.

Table 1. Polling stations opening (on the basis of 783 PSs)

Period	Between 7.01 a.m. and 7.15 a.m.:	At 7.00 a.m.:	Between 7.01 a.m. and 7.15 a.m.:	After 7.15 a.m.
Number of polling stations open	69 (9%)	640 (82%)	66 (8%)	8 (1%)

### 1.2. PS accessibility

Promo-LEX OM highlights that over 40% of all observed PSs are not heated during the cold season of the year. At least 45% of the monitored polling station were not accessible for persons with physical impairments. In addition, according to observers in about 2% of the polling stations the light is not sufficiently bright for the voting and vote counting process.

Table 2. Aspects related to PS accessibility

Subject	YES	NO	Total PSs
Is the polling station accessible for persons with physical impairments?	837 (55%)	684 (45%)	1,521
Is the polling station heat?	865 (57%)	656 (43%)	1,521
Is the polling station lit sufficiently for the electoral procedures?	769 (98%)	12 (2%)	781

<sup>2</sup> On the election day, the short-term observers sent their observations to the central team via text messages. According to the methodology, each observer had two breaks of up to one hour each.

### 1.3. PS Closing

Table 3. PS closing the ballot paper counting procedures

Subject	YES	NO	Total PSs
Did the polling station close at 9:00 p.m.?	694 (99%)	7 (1%)	701
Were the special forms for counting the voting results initially developed?	657 (84%)	124 (16%)	781
Did only one EOPS member distribute the ballot papers to all participants for tabulation?	595 (76%)	186 (24%)	781
Was the whole process of ballot boxes opening and ballot paper counting shot continuously, without any interruptions?	768 (98%)	13 (2%)	781
In your opinion, were the voting and vote counting procedures conducted in line with the requirements for protection measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (wear gloves, face masks/shields, ventilate the rooms, keep the social distance)?	672 (86%)	109 (14%)	781

The absolute majority of the observed polling stations (99%) were closed at 9.00 pm. At least seven polling stations (1%) were closed after 9.00 pm.

We highlight that 186 monitored polling stations (24%) did not comply with the rule that the ballot papers shall be presented to all participants in the counting process by one single member of the office. Whereas 124 PSs (16%) violated the procedure of filling in the special vote counting form.

According to Promo-LEX observers, in 109 PSs (14%) the voting and vote counting procedures were conducted in violation of the requirements for protection measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19.



## II. INCIDENTS OBSERVED DURING THE ELECTION DAY

Once the information reported by STOs from PSs and by mobile teams were processed, a number of 481 incidents were analysed and published in press releases.

Promo-LEX OM expresses its concern regarding the 10 cases, at least, of intimidating observers or obstructing the free observation process in polling stations. Note that in at least two cases electoral officials, and in isolated cases police officers prevented the access of Promo-LEX observers after the latter notified some incidents in the respective polling stations.

Failure to observe COVID-19 protection and prevention measures were the most frequently reported incidents – 75 cases. In this context, we believe that it is necessary to add more voting booths in some PSs in order to make the flow of voters more efficient, especially in the polling stations with a higher presence of voters. Other reported incidents included: taking a picture of the ballot papers and other violations of the secret of vote (59), organised transportation of voters (50), deficiencies in the operation of “Elections” SAIS (35), presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters in the area of the polling station (34) and errors in the lists of voters (29). A share of 74% of the reported cases of organised transportation of voters involve the transnistrian region.

Promo-LEX OM also draws attention to incidents related to: electioneering on the election day (14) and rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters (14). In addition, we signal an alarming situation that could affect the credibility of the electoral process, reported for PS 29/20 Soroca, Cainarii Vechi, where the EOPS found that 200 unused ballot papers disappeared.

Compared with the Parliamentary elections of 24 February 2019 (la latest national election), we notice that the structure of the most frequently reported incidents remained unchanged: deficiencies in SAISE and in lists of voters, organised transportation of voters and violation of the secret of vote (including by taking pictures of the ballot papers).

### 2.1. Methodological notes

On the election day, incidents were reported by the following categories of Promo-LEX observers:

- 608 static observers in polling stations on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in the established sociological sample;
- observers in 80 mobile teams that covers the territory of the country, including the territorial administrative units where polling stations were set up for voters from the transnistrian region;
- 42 static observers in polling stations for transnistrian region
- 52 static observers in polling stations abroad.

A total of 520 cases were reported, of which 481 were classified as incidents (Annex 1).

Total cases reported by observers	Total incidents processed by the Central Team and included in public reports	Total cases reported that were not classified as incidents
520	481	40

## 2.2. Overview of incidents

### 2.2.1. Preventing the free observation process at the polling station or intimidating observers

According to the Article 68(5) of the Electoral Code, CEC-accredited observers may monitor the electoral process across the whole country and in all polling stations, whereas ECC-accredited observers – only within the area of the constituency. Accredited observers shall have the right to assist at all electoral operations, all meetings of the electoral bodies, including on the election day, without intervening in the electoral process or in other electoral operations, and inform the chairperson of the electoral body about the noticed irregularities.

According to reports submitted by Promo-LEX OM observers, there were at least **10 cases** where observers were restricted or prohibited from freely monitoring the processes in the polling station. We draw attention on cases of observer intimidation, in particular by EOPS members, and afterwards some isolated attempts to take the observer out of the polling station, claiming that they had to go to the police and testify.

Moreover, after<sup>3</sup> the election day, the Mission and several individual observers received phone calls, apparently from the police, who asked for detailed information about the incidents described in public press releases or invited them to the police office in order to testify about the reported incidents. Promo-LEX Observation Mission qualifies these situations as attempts to intimidate national observers in order to silence them during the second round of election. The Mission hence reiterates its availability to cooperate with law enforcement agencies and underlines that will respond only to the legal requests that will be received on the Mission's address and will provide the needed legal aid to all observers that will be summoned lawfully by law enforcement agencies. In this context, the Mission urges law enforcement agencies to avoid any situations that could be regarded as selective justice and attempts to intimidate or silence Promo-LEX observers.

<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Preventing the free observation process</b>	
<b>4 cases</b>	<b>Restricted access due to protection measures against COVID-19 (2 cases):</b> PS 1/1, PS 16/3 <b>Restricted access due to other reasons (2 cases):</b> PS 1/2, PS 36/7.
<b>Observer Intimidation</b>	
<b>6 cases</b>	<b>By EOPS members (3 cases):</b> PS 28/3, PS 28/4, PS 32/10. <b>By others persons (3 cases):</b> PS 1/223, PS 1/329, PS 37/24.

### 2.2.2. Refusal/difficulties in obtaining copies of protocols in polling stations and constituency councils

According to Article 63(4) of the Electoral Code, the protocol on voting results shall be prepared in several copies: one copy of the protocol shall be kept by EOPS, one copy shall be submitted to ECC, one copy shall be displayed at the entry into the PS, **and the other shall be mandatorily submitted to representatives of election contenders and to observers.**

Contrary to the quoted legal provisions, Promo-LEX OM observers found it difficult to receive protocols from **6 PSs**. We reiterate that this phenomenon affects seriously the integrity and transparency of the vote counting and tabulation process. The refusals reveal a systemic problem related to electoral bodies' understanding of the role of observers and transparency of vote counting and tabulation procedures.

<sup>3</sup> The Mission received such a request neither during the election campaign, nor after publishing intermediary mission reports that describe plenty of situation that as a rule should be investigated by law enforcement agencies.

Constituency/Polling station	Settlement	Constituency /Polling station	Settlement	Constituency/ Polling station	Settlement
C01SV036	01 - Botanica	C28SV003	28 - Singerei	C34SV022	34 - Ghilceni
C01SV051	01 - Botanica	C30SV046	30 - Vorniceni	C37SV014	37 - Causeni
C24SV034	24 - Lipnic				

### 2.2.3. Ballot boxes were not sealed according to the legal procedures/tearing/damage or absence of seals on ballot boxes

According to Article 60(1) of the Electoral Code, on the election day at 07.00 am, the EOPS Chairperson, in the presence of no less than half of the members of the office, shall check the ballot boxes and seal them. According to points 26 and 27 of CEC Guidelines on Enabling the Polling Station Infrastructure, the ballot boxes shall be secured through sealing. The stationary ballot boxes shall be sealed by means of 4 collar-type self-locking seals, and the mobile ballot boxes - by 1 (one) seals.

Promo-LEX OM observers found **23 cases** of non-compliance with the procedures of ballot boxes sealing, namely:

Ballot boxes were not sealed according to the legal procedures								
EC	Case No:	PS	CE	Case No:	PS	CE	Case No:	PS
01	1	221	06	1	031	31	1	006
1	4	325; 329; 416; 443	13	2	005	32	1	19
2	1	52	28	1	52	33	2	9 and 28
4	1	1	29	3	24; 30; 054	35	1	72
6	3	4, 9 and 35.	30	1	42			

### 2.2.4. Presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters in the area of the polling station (within 100 meters from the PS)

According to Article 60(7), the responsibility for maintaining order on election day in the polling place and territory adjacent to it within an area of 100 meters shall be assigned to the chairperson of the electoral office of the polling station. The decisions made in this regard shall be mandatory for all.

Promo-LEX observers found **34 cases** of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters within the area of the polling station (within the area of 100 m from the PS).

Presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters within the area of the polling station		
Beneficiary	Polling stations	PS No
PPS	PS 34/33; PS 29/30; PS 18/32; PS 18/012; PS 36/16; PS 29/16; PS 25/34; PS 18/071; PS 18/65; PS 37/4; PS 34/17; PS 18/61; PS 37/5; PS 37/41; PS 18/7	15
Igor DODON	PS 18/54, PS 18/63; PS 29/30; PS 18/12; PS 18/61; PS 18/7	6
PN	PS 36/4; PS 18/63; PS 29/30; PS 18/32; PS 18/012; PS 36/16; PS 7/6; PS 18/071; PS 18/12; PS 18/61; PS 18/55; PS 18/7; PS 27/27	13
PAS	PS 7/6; PS 18/63; PS 11/30; PS 29/30; PS 4/28; PS 18/61; PS 18/7	7
PUN	PS 7/6, PS 10/23; PS 34/33; PS 11/30; PS 29/30; PS 18/65; PS 18/61; PS 18/7	8
PPPDA	PS 01/266; PS 13/001; PS 16/2; PS 18/63; PS 34/33; PS 11/30; PS 29/30; PS 27/32; PS 27/22; PS 27/023; PS 31/32; PS 18/65; PS 9/36; PS 34/17; PS	17

	18/61; PS 1/302; PS 18/7	
<b>PLDM</b>	PS 18/65; PS 18/61; PS 29/30; PS 18/55; PS 18/7	5

### 2.2.5. Unjustified presence of unauthorised persons inside or within 100 m from the polling station

According to Article 60(3) of the Electoral Code, the following have the right to attend the work of electoral bodies: members/representatives of hierarchically higher electoral bodies; representatives of election contenders within the electoral bodies; national/international observers accredited by relevant bodies and their interpreters, if needed; media representatives. According to Article 60(7) of the Electoral Code the responsibility for maintaining order on election day in the polling place and territory adjacent to it within a radius of 100 meters shall be assigned to the chairperson of the electoral office of the polling stations, and their decisions shall be binding for everyone.

Promo-LEX observers found at least **25 cases** of unauthorised persons staying inside the PS or within the area of 100 m from the polling station longer than allowed by law.

<b>Unjustified presence of unauthorised persons inside the polling station or within 100 m from the polling station</b>	
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Polling stations</i>
<b>6 cases</b>	<b>Involving representatives of political parties:</b> PPS (2 cases) – PS 25/37, PS 34/5, PS 36/8. PSRM (3 cases) – PS 24/25, PS 25/31, PS 27/25.
<b>4 cases</b>	<b>Involving persons holding public dignity positions (mayors, district presidents), members of political parties:</b> PSRM (3 cases): PS 6/5, PS 16/43, PS 18/1. PPVP (1 case): PS 1/261
<b>5 cases</b>	<b>Involving representatives of National Anti-Crisis Task Force ("Народный Антикризисный Штаб - НАИШ"):</b> PS 7/3, PS 36/6, PS 36/7, PS 36/8, PS 36/44.
<b>10 cases</b>	<b>Unjustified presence of some unidentified persons:</b> PS 1/163, PS 1/218, PS 1/325, PS 1/379, PS 4/39, PS 9/7, PS 18/7, PS 32/8, PS 33/1, PS 36/55

### 2.2.6. Rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters

According to Article 41(5)-(6) of the Electoral Code, election contenders shall not offer voters money or distribute goods free of charge, including from humanitarian aid or other charity acts, except for symbolic gifts, representing electoral or political advertising, produced with funds declared on the 'Electoral Fund' account, carrying the symbols of the election contender and with a market value not exceeding two conventional units.

Promo-LEX OM observers found **14 cases** of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters.

<b>Rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters within the area and/or near the polling station</b>	
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Description</i>
<b>14 cases</b>	<b>By representatives of contender Violeta Ivanov (1 case):</b> - Cash rewards: PS 33/25.
	<b>By representatives of contender Renato Usatii (1 case):</b> - Cash rewards: PS 37/3.
	<b>By representatives of contender Igor Dodon (2 case):</b> - Cash rewards: PS 37/3, PS 37/6 (50 euros).

	<p><b>By unidentified election candidates (10 cases):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cash rewards (7 cases): PS 1/ 327, PS 2/58, PS 18/54, PS 29/10, PS 37/14, PS 37/19 (100 -400 rubles), PS 37/36 (800 lei)</li> <li>- In-kind rewards (3 cases): PS 19/25 (alcoholic beverages); PS 37/17 (gloves, masks, pens), transnistrian region, Rezina (gloves, masks, bags with unidentified content).</li> </ul>
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### 2.2.7. Electioneering on the election day

According to Article 52(10) of the Electoral Code, on the election day no electioneering is allowed in the polling station or at the entry of the polling station.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **14 cases** that can be qualified as electioneering or black PR inside or at the entry of the polling station to influence the voters. Thus, 2 of the identified cases involved PPS representatives, 2 cases - Igor Dodon, 1 case - PN. As for other 9 cases of electioneering inside the PS, 5 cases involved voters, 3 cases - EOPS members, 1 case - unidentified.

Electioneering at the entry of or inside the polling station		
Electioneerer	Polling stations	Number of cases
PPS	PS 04/037, PS 32/8	2
Igor Dodon	PS 36/19, PS 7/53	2
PN	PS 18/13	1
Voter	PS 2/42, PS 2/58, PS 9/40, PS 32/10, PS 36/19	5
EOPS members	PS 1/51, PS 12/2, PS 11/5	3
Unidentified	PS 1/362	1

### 2.2.8. Organised voter transportation (by buses, passenger vans or other vehicles that wouldn't normally be around)

CEC Decision No 4390 of 20.10.2020 prohibits, during the voting period, the movement of any vehicle with a capacity higher than 8 persons that is not registered as a regular public transport vehicle according to the law of the Republic of Moldova.

Promo-LEX OM observers identified at least **33 PSs**, respectively **about 50 instances** that can be interpreted as organised transportation of voters. As many as 37 of cases (about 74%) are related to the polling stations established for the transnistrian region. Besides, in terms of the number of vehicles used, the PS from Constituency 37 stands out of the other polling stations in the country.

Organised transportation of voters (by buses, passenger vans or other vehicles that wouldn't normally be around)			
Constituency	No of cases	Number of PS	Number of vehicles used
1 Chisinau	2	PS 161, 262	1 car, 1 passenger van
1 Russian Federation	1	PS 329	1 bus
7 Cahul	1	PS 6	1 passenger van
10 Causeni	1	PS 7	1 passenger van
11 Cimislia	2	PS 26, 38	2 passenger vans
25 Orhei	1	PS 45	1 car
26 Rezina	1	PS 9	1 passenger van

<b>28 Singerei</b>	1	PS 37	1 passenger van
<b>36 ATU Gagauzia</b>	2	PS 8, 44	1 car, 1 passenger van
<b>37 Transnistrian region</b>	38	PS 3, 6, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, including the Rezina-Ribnita bridge (from the transnistrian side to the check point)	At least 41 personal cars, 10 passenger vans

### **2.2.9. Preventing the access of voters and organised transport to polling stations set up for the transnistrian region**

*According to Article 7 of the Electoral Code, no one has the right to exert any pressure on a voter to make him/her vote or not, nor to prevent him/her from expressing his/her will. And according to Article 75(1) of the Electoral Code, individuals and legal entities that prevent people from freely exercising their electoral rights, hinder the activity of electoral bodies shall bear liability in line with the current law.*

Promo-LEX OM observers identified at least **6 cases** of preventing the free access of voters from the transnistrian region to the territory controlled by constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova or conflicts involving these voters.

<b>Preventing the access of organised transport to polling stations set up for the transnistrian region</b>	
<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>6 cases</b>	- <b>Cases or attempts to block the access of road transport (4 cases):</b> transnistrian region - Rezina, Varnita, Sanatauca (2 cases); - <b>Conflicts or protests related to voters from the transnistrian region (2 cases) -</b> PS 37/6- Anenii Noi, Gura Bicului; PS 37/10- Anenii Noi, Varnita

### **2.2.10. Unjustified termination/suspension of voting at the polling station**

*According to Article 56 (1) of the Electoral Code, during the time allotted for voting the polling place may not be closed nor may voting be terminated, with the exception of cases of mass disorders, natural disasters, or other unforeseen circumstances which make conducting the elections impossible or dangerous for the voters.*

Promo-LEX OM observers identified **12 PSs**, where the voting process was suspended unreasonably for periods ranging from 3 minutes to 1.5 hours. We draw attention to the frequent cases when the voting process was suspended to disinfect the polling station.

<b>Unjustified suspension of voting process</b>	
<b>Number of PSs</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>12 PSs</b>	<b>Due to electricity outages (2 cases):</b> PS 17/7 ( 1h 20 min.); PS 18/12 (3 min). <b>In order to disinfect the polling station (6 cases):</b> PS 1/1 ( 10h 20 min.); PS 1/14 (10- 15 min). PS 1/30 (10 min), PS 1/37 (10-12 min) PS 1/58 (15 min); PS 7/60 (5 min- 3 times). <b>Due to other reasons (4 cases):</b> PS 1/353, PS 35/72, PS 36/9 (35 min.), PS 36/ 27 (15-20 min.);

### **2.2.11. Deficient operation of "Elections" SAIS**

*Point 61 of the Regulation on the Activity of EOPS – the member of the electoral office of the polling station shall hand the voter the ballot paper only after the voter was looked up in the Elections SAIS*

and after it was determined that the voter meets all the participation requirements which shall enable him/her to vote in that particular polling station.

Promo-LEX observers found **35 problematic situations** when “Elections” SAIS had technical issues (stopped operating, lost Internet connection), as well as issues related to content (mismatches between data in the voter’s ID documents and data in “Elections” SAIS, the information system showed that the voter had voted, though the latter had not, issues related to assigning voters to polling stations).

<b>Deficiencies in the operation of Elections SAIS</b>	
<b>Technical deficiencies (14 cases)</b>	<b>Content-related deficiencies (21 case)</b>
<b>“Elections” SAIS (12 cases):</b> PS 1/34; 1/78; 1/125; 1/137; 1/223; 1/232; 1/339; 1/362; 32/28; 36/9; 37/6; 37/11;	PS 1/92; 1/125; 1/137; 1/154; 1/373; 1/383; 14/1 (2 cases ); 7/6; 15/2; 18/26; 25/50; 26/24; 26/31; 27/25; 37/25; 37/32 (2 cases), 37/33, 37/34, 37/35
<b>Scanners for voter identification (2 cases):</b> PS 1/14, 1/22	

### **2.2.12. Errors in the lists of voters**

The lists of voters drafted based on the State Register of Voters are lists containing the name of all citizens having the right to vote, who are domiciled or reside on the territory of a polling station. A voter may only be included on one single list of voters and in one single polling station.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **29 deficiencies** in lists of voters, such as: *inconsistent addresses (22 cases); deceased voters (5 cases), signatures for other people (2 cases).*

<b>Errors in the lists of voters</b>		
<b>Inconsistent addresses (22)</b>	<b>Deceased voters (5)</b>	<b>Signatures for other people (2)</b>
PS 01/092; 37/35; 14/6; 9/41; 25/011; 25/009; 18/026; 21/049; 01/092; 32/21; 01/054; 01/266; 36/40; 32/31; 27/25 <sup>3</sup> ; 18/55; 18/29; 1/275; 01/241; 21/014	PS 2/22; 1/51; 01/035; 1/54; 9/40	PS 37/22, 16/13

### **2.2.13. Taking pictures of the ballot papers, other ways of violating the secret of vote**

According to point 68 of the Regulation on the activity of electoral offices of the polling station, it is prohibited to take pictures of the ballot paper with the vote cast. According to point 19 of the Guidelines on PS Infrastructure, to ensure the secret of voting, booths shall be placed with the open part to the wall, at a distance of 1 m. at most.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **59 cases** of voters taking pictures of their ballot papers and violation of the secret of vote, by positioning wrongly the voting booth or revealing purposefully who the voter voted for.

Taking pictures of the ballot papers, other violations of secret of vote	
Number of cases	Polling stations
34 cases	<b>EOPS members stepped in to solve the incident when voters took pictures of their ballot papers, in the following PSs:</b> 1/29; 1/35; 1/41; 1/105; 1/108; 1/114; 1/137; 1/192; 1/194; 1/216; 1/218; 1/223; 1/225; 1/253; 1/261; 1/275; 1/353 (3 cases); 1/377 (2 cases); 7/8; 9/40; 18/4; 18/22; 20/2; 20/46; 21/41; 23/31; 32/3; 36/57; 37/1 (3 cases).
17 cases	<b>EOPS members did not step in to solve the incident when voters took pictures of their ballot papers, in the following PSs:</b> 1/29; 1/54; 1/91; 1/349; 1/369; 1/373; 1/380; 1/383; 1/405 (3 cases); 1/415; 30/9; 32/31; 37/3; 36/8; 36/19.
1 case	<b>In the following PSs, voting booths were positioned in a way that did not allow ensuring the secret of vote:</b> 32/3.
7 cases	<b>Other violations of the secret of vote took place in the following PSs:</b> 1/87; 1/105; 1/266; 11/24; 25/12; 25/45; 27/3.

#### 2.2.14. Unjustified group voting (2 or more people were in the voting booths at the same time)

Articles 5 and 6 of the Electoral Code stipulate the universal principles underpinning democratic elections, specifically **direct and secret vote**, i.e. a voter shall vote personally, in secret, thus excluding any possibility to influence voters. Voting on behalf of other individuals is prohibited. The voter who is not able to fill the ballot in by himself/herself has the right to invite into the booth another person, except for EOPS members, representatives of election contenders/participants in the referendum and other accredited individuals entitled to attend the electoral procedures.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **11 cases** that can be qualified as violation of direct and secret voting or unjustified group voting, during the election day. According to observers, persons with vision impairments were involved in two cases only.

Unjustified group voting		
Total number of cases - 11		
PS where EOPS members stepped in - 9	PS where EOPS members did not react - 1	Data are missing - 1
PS 6/17; PS 16/38, PS 8/5, PS 16/27, PS 01/029, PS 1/105, PS 1/74, PS 1/154, PS 01/108	PS 18/026	PS 01/003

#### 2.2.15. Electricity outages

According to point 1 of the Decision on additional duties for some central public authorities, local public authorities, as well as other institutions related to proper organisation of the elections of the President of the Republic of Moldova on 1 November 2020, dated 25 August, electricity suppliers shall deliver, **with no interruptions**, electricity to the premises of electoral councils and electoral offices of polling stations, according to coverage areas.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **8 cases** of electricity outages during the election day.



Electricity outages	
Number of cases	Polling stations
1	PS 1/269; PS 2/22; PS 4/14; PS 9/23; PS 17/046; PS 18/012; PS 22/002; PS 30/16

### 2.2.16. Problematic aspects related to vote counting

As reported by observers, electoral offices carried out the vote counting in violation of Article 61 of the Electoral Code. Thus, Promo-LEX OM observers found at least **15 cases** when the vote counting procedure was not complied with.

An outstanding situation was noticed in PS 29/20 Soroca, Cainarii Vechi, where 200 unused ballot papers were found missing after counting the ballot papers to be annulled. The EOPS chairperson called the Police, but at the time when the observer left the polling station the missing ballot papers had not been found.

Problematic aspects related to vote counting		
Issues	Polling stations	Number of cases
Counting the ballot papers simultaneously with annulling the unused ballot papers	PS 31/02, PS 32/21	2
Failure to shoot on video the vote counting process	PS 01/218, PS 01/203	2
Presence of unauthorized persons	PS 01/100, PS 01/216	2
Ballot papers missing	PS 9/32, PS 29/20	2
Too many ballot papers	PS 1/221	1
Non-transparent vote counting	PS 22/33	1
Other	PS 01/056; PS 1/100; PS 1/406; PS 15/13; PS 1/410	5

### 2.2.17. Interrupted video recording of electoral procedures for polling station opening or procedures of ballot papers counting, other incidents related to video recording of electoral processes

According to point 11 of the Regulation on the operation of the Video Recording System in PSs, the video recording system shall be turned on only during the election day:

- video recording shall start when beginning the preparatory electoral procedures for polling station opening and shall end when the polling station opens;
- video recording shall start at the moment of closing the polling station and shall end after completing the vote counting and tabulation by members of electoral office of the polling station.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **22 incidents** related to video recording of polling station opening procedures or ballot papers counting procedures.

<b>Interrupted video recording polling station opening or ballot papers counting, other incidents related to video recording of electoral processes</b>	
<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Polling stations</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>The electoral procedures for polling station opening were recorded partially/not recorded:</b> PS 1/92; 1/383; 1/329; 1/415; 18/9; 25/40; 25/45; 27/25; 27/37.
<b>9</b>	<b>Vote counting process was recorded partially/not recorded:</b> PS 1/51; 1/192; 1/346; 1/383; 1/410; 7/1; 25/11; 25/45; 27/25.
<b>3</b>	<b>Video recording of the voting process:</b> PS 27/7; 27/3; 27/27.
<b>1</b>	<b>Incorrect positioning of the video camera, in violation of the law:</b> PS 15/4.

### **2.2.18. Problematic aspects related to voting by mobile ballot box**

According to Article 60(6) of the Electoral Code, when the chairperson of the electoral office of the polling station authorises a **mobile ballot box** to leave the polling station, he/she shall announce this fact as well as the list of voters that requested to vote at place of residence beforehand to the member representing the contestants and the individuals accredited to observe electoral procedures.

According to points 8-10, 13 of the Guidelines on Voting by Mobile Ballot Box, the number of mobile ballot boxes shall be established in a decision of the electoral office of the polling station. If a large number of such requests are received on the election day, the bureau chairperson has the right to authorise the mobile ballot box to leave the polling station at any hour after the polling station opens. Members of the electoral office, who left with the mobile ballot box, shall return to the polling station before 9.00 p.m. After voting at the place of stay, the unused ballot papers shall be returned to the electoral office of the polling station, which shall be recorded in the electoral office's report.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **3 incidents** related to voting by mobile ballot box.

<b>Problematic aspects related to voting by mobile ballot box</b>	
<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Polling stations</b>
<b>3</b>	- EOPS members leaving 2 or more times with the same mobile ballot box: PS 1/100, 1/282. - Extending the period for voting by mobile ballot box: PS 9/35.

### **2.2.19. Failure to observe COVID-19 protection and prevention measures**

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **75 cases** of non-compliance with the rules established by CEC its Guidelines on COVID-19 prevention measures during the election period.

<b>Failure to comply with COVID-19 protection and prevention measures</b>		
<b>Violations</b>	<b>Polling stations</b>	<b>Number of cases</b>
<b>Related to the access to polling station for persons with symptoms of acute respiratory disease, temperature 37+</b>	PS 2/45; PS 9/7; PS 10/36; PS 28/4; PS 32/15 <sup>2</sup>	<b>6</b>
<b>Failure to measure the body temperature, there was no register</b>	PS 1/13; PS 1/405; PS 01/154; PS 6/12; PS 6/35; PS 16/12; PS 18/026; PS 18/065; PS 18/52; PS 32/033; PS 32/33	<b>11</b>
<b>Failure to make sure that face masks and shields are worn</b>	PS 6/35; PS 9/7; PS 18/9; PS 18/039; PS 18/15; PS 18/45; PS 18/61; PS 19/017; PS 31/24; PS	<b>12</b>

	32/10; PS 32/33; PS 33/7	
<b>Failure to keep the social distance</b>	PS 01/190; PS 01/193; PS 01/194; PS 01/195; PS 01/196; PS 01/197; PS 01/203 <sup>3</sup> ; PS 01/213; PS 01/242; PS 01/291; PS 01/292 <sup>2</sup> ; PS 1/213; PS 1/383; PS 10/4; PS 10/31; PS 10/41; PS 11/024; PS 12/27; PS 18/001; PS 18/071; PS 18/16; PS 18/23 <sup>2</sup> ; PS 18/28; PS 18/32; PS 18/37; PS 18/44; PS 18/45; PS 18/59; PS 18/64; PS 18/65 <sup>2</sup> ; PS 31/24; PS 31/26; PS 32/011; PS 32/3; PS 32/21 <sup>3</sup> ; PS 37/3; PS 37/12; PS 37/36; PS 37/39	<b>46</b>

### **2.2.20. Other**

The **30 incidents** in “Other” category include (see the full list in Annex 1): limited access to PS, voting on the basis of inappropriate identity documents, failure of the PS electoral office to comply with the law, etc.

### III. RESULTS OF FINAL VOTE COUNTING BY PROMO-LEX

Promo-LEX OM analysed the accuracy of 2,135 Vote Counting Protocols in the presidential election of Moldova of the total of 2,135 protocols. A total of 53 errors were found in 27 protocols on the basis of verification formulae. The number of protocols with errors increases insignificantly if compared with the general local elections of 2019, but is lower if compared with the presidential election of 2016 and parliamentary election of 2019.

The results of parallel vote counting for the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova do not reveal any significant differences between the final data presented by CEC and final data obtained by Promo-LEX. In addition, Promo-LEX OM notices an increasing dynamic in the number of voters who cast their votes on the basis of lists of voters at their place of stay in the Republic of Moldova.

#### 3.1. Accuracy of the vote counting protocols (VCP)

In the context of monitoring the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova on 1 November 2020, Promo-LEX OM analysed the accuracy of 2,135 Vote Counting Protocols (of the total of 2,135 protocols prepared). Of them, 782 were received on paper by the static observers and the mobile teams that attended the polling stations closing and ballot papers counting procedures. Other 1,353 copies of the protocols were received as a picture by long-term observers in ECC, once EOPS received the protocols concerned. Eight protocols are however missing, of which in one case - CVP from polling station 13/12, Elizavetovca, Donduseni, ECC did not allow the LTO to take a picture of the respective protocol.

A total of 53 errors were found in 27 protocols on the basis of verification formulae (see Annex 3).

Table 2. Type and number of errors found

ERROR TYPE	NUMBER
$D == F+H$	6
$E == C-D$	7
$I == C+J$	12
$H == G1+G2+G3+G4+Gn$	9
$F == D-H$	6
$J == I-C$	12
$C >= D$	1

The accuracy was checked by examining the formulae in the body of the protocol:  $c \geq d$ ;  $d=f+h$ ;  $e=c-d$ ;  $f=d-h$ ;  $h=g1+g2+g3+g4+...+gn$ ;  $i=c+j$ ;  $j=i-c$ .

The formula  $d=f+h$  was applied incorrectly in 6 protocols. In these cases it was not proved that the number of ballot papers taken out of the boxes coincides with the total number of invalidated and valid ballot papers. There can be doubts regarding the accuracy of valid vote tabulation, thus – regarding the results obtained by the candidates.

The formula  $e=c-d$  was applied incorrectly in 7 protocols. Thus, in these PS the number of signatures on the lists of voters does not match the number of ballot papers in the ballot boxes.

The formula  $i=c+j$  could not be applied correctly in 12 protocols. The same situation was found with regards to formula  $j=i-c$ . Thus, either the unused and cancelled ballots or the signatures in the lists of

voters were not counted correctly. Actually, we found that “unused and cancelled” can mislead EOPS members and can put them in two different categories.

The formula  $h=g_1+g_2+g_3+g_4+\dots+g_n$  was applied incorrectly in 9 protocols. We draw special attention to this formula: the summed up votes for candidates does not match the total number of valid votes cast in the analysed protocols. The correctness of the votes of election candidates is hence questioned.

The formula  $f=d-h$  is meant to check the number of invalidated ballots by deducting the valid ones from the total number of ballot papers. This verification formula was applied incorrectly in 6 protocols. The conclusions regarding the verification of the formula  $d=f+h$  are valid.

The formula  $c \geq d$  implies that the number of voters who were issued ballot papers (known due to the signatures on the lists of voters) must be equal to or greater than the number of ballot papers taken out of the ballot boxes. One protocol in which this formula is not complied with was found, which means that they took out of the ballot boxes more ballot papers than the electoral body actually issued.

In comparative terms, Promo-LEX OM underlines that the number of protocols, drafted erroneously by EOPS, increased insignificantly compared with the recent general local elections (October 2019), but is lower if compared with the presidential election of 2016 and parliamentary election of 2019.

Table 3. Number of Vote Counting Protocol with errors (in comparative terms)

	Presidential Election 2016, round II	Parliamentary Election 2019 <sup>4</sup>	General Local Elections 2019	Presidential Election 2020, round I
<b>Protocols with errors</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>27</b>

### 3.2. Comparative analysis of the data on parallel vote counting performed by Promo-LEX OM and data communicated by CEC

Promo-LEX computed the total vote counting results on the basis of 2,135 vote counting protocols, and CEC approved the final results on the basis of all 2,143 protocols drafted. The VCPs were received both on paper (782 copies) from the observers present in the polling stations, as well as a picture (1,353 copies), obtained by long-term observers from ECC.

We also draw the attention that Promo-LEX preliminary results were estimated for the national level on the basis of the protocols obtained from the sample of 608 PSs.

Table 3. Parallel vote counting results

No	Candidate name	Party	CEC, preliminary	Promo-LEX, preliminary	CEC, Final		Promo-LEX, Final		Difference CEC/Promo-LEX, final (%)
1	Renato Usatii	PN	16.90%	16.64%	227,939	16.90%	227,347	16.92%	+0.02%
2	Andrei Nastase	PPPDA	3.26%	3.08%	43,924	3.26%	43,849	3.26%	0
3	Tudor Deliu	PLDM	1.37%	1.45%	18,486	1.37%	18,348	1.37%	0
4	Igor Dodon	IC	32.61%	35.56%	439,866	32.61%	438,061	32.59%	-0.02%
5	Violeta Ivanov	PPS	6.49%	6.22%	87,542	6.49%	87,229	6.49%	0
6	Maia Sandu	PAS	36.16%	33.73%	487,635	36.16%	486,023	36.16%	0

<sup>4</sup>National consistency

7	Octavian Ticu	PUN	2.01%	2.12%	27,170	2.01%	27,042	2.01%	0
8	Dorin Chirtoaca	BE Unirea	1.20%	1.20%	16,157	1.20%	16,101	1.20%	0

### 3.3. Dynamics of voting at the place of stay

The pandemic could result in more applications to vote at the voters' place of stay. According to CEC data, as many as 39,919 requests to vote at the place of stay were submitted for the presidential election of 1 November 2020, of which 1,616 — due to the pandemic.

We notice an increasing dynamic in the number of voters who vote by mobile ballot box in the Republic of Moldova. There is an increase by about 30% compared to the first round of the presidential election of 2016. In addition, we draw the attention on the sharp increase (by 22%) of the number of persons who voted by mobile ballot box in the second round of the 2016 election, compared to the first round. We remind that the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters<sup>5</sup> does not recommend using mobile ballot boxes due to the high risks of fraud involved.

Presidential Elections, 2016 <sup>6</sup>		Parliamentary Election, 2019 <sup>7</sup>	Presidential Election, round I, 2020 <sup>8</sup>
First Round	Second Round		
Voted - 28,362	Voted - 36,018	Voted - 35,041	Requests - 39,919 (1,616 due to COVID-19)

During the election day, Promo-LEX observers from mobile teams monitored the extent to which the right to vote at place of stay was exercised. Hence, 820 polling stations were monitored after PS opening, in 310 of which the mobile ballot box was already returned. According to the data provided by EOPS chairpersons, in 50 (16%) of the 310 EOPS, not all voters from the list of voting at the place of stay managed to vote. Promo-LEX OM does not have any information on the reasons for this partial voting, but we hope that it is not related to limiting the access of voters with COVID-19 symptoms, who requested to vote at their place of stay.

<sup>5</sup> [Code of Good Practice](#) in Electoral Matters. Guidelines and Explanatory Report

<sup>6</sup> [CEC Report](#) on the results of the Moldova Presidential Election of 30 October 2016.

<sup>7</sup> [Decision No 2420](#) of 03.03.2019 approving the Report on the results of the Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Moldova of 24 February 2019.

<sup>8</sup> [39,919 voters](#) requested to vote at their place of stay

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

para. – paragraph  
LPA – Local Public Authorities  
Art. – Article  
EOPS – Electoral Office of the Polling Station  
BE Unirea – UNIREA Electoral Bloc  
twp. – township  
CEC – Central Election Commission  
ECC – level-two Electoral Constituency Council  
IC – independent candidate  
let. – Letter  
OM – Observation Mission  
mun. – Municipality  
No – number  
t. – town  
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
OSCE/ODIHR – OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights  
LTO – Long Term Observer  
STO – Short-Term Observer  
PAS – Action and Solidarity Political Party  
p. – Item  
PDM – Democratic Party of Moldova  
PLDM – Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova  
PN – Our Party  
PPPDA – Dignity and Truth Platform Political Party  
PPS – Sor Political Party  
PSRM – Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova  
PUN – National Unity Party  
REO – Registry of Electoral Officials  
v. – village  
PS – polling station  
ATU – Administrative Territorial Unit  
c.u. – conventional units  
USAID – United States Agency for International Development  
ATUG - Autonomous Territorial Unit Gagauzia

## ANNEXES

### Annex 1. Categories of incidents reported by observers and published by Promo-LEX OM

No	INCIDENT CATEGORY	NUMBER
1.	Intimidating observers or preventing the free observation process at the polling station	10
2.	Ballot boxes were not sealed according to the legal procedures/tearing/damage or absence of seals on ballot boxes	23
3.	Unjustified presence of unauthorised persons inside or within 100 m from the polling station	25
4.	Presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters in the vicinity of the polling station (within the area of 100 m from the PS)	34
5.	Interrupted video recording of electoral procedures for polling station opening or procedures of ballot papers counting	22
6.	Electioneering or black PR within the radius of 100 m and/or near the polling station to influence the voters	14
7.	Rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters within the are of 100 m from the polling station in order to influence them	14
8.	Organised voter transportation (by buses, passenger vans or other vehicles that wouldn't normally be around)	50
9.	Failure to observe COVID-19 protection and prevention measures	75
10.	Deficient operation of Elections SAIS (suspended functionalities; situations where Elections SAIS showed that the voter had voted, although the latter claimed he had not)	35
11.	Deficiencies in lists of voters (gaps between addresses; deceased voters; signatures instead of other people)	29
12.	Taking pictures of the ballot papers, other violations of the secret ballot (submission of ID card on the basis of which the voter had already voted, inappropriate laying out of booths because of which one could see who other voters cast their vote for etc.)	59
13.	Unjustified group voting (2 or more people were in the voting booths at the same time)	11
14.	Unjustified termination/suspension of voting at the polling station	12
15.	Electricity outages	8
16.	Preventing the access of voters and organised transport to polling stations set up for the transnistrian region	6
17.	Problematic aspects related to vote counting	15
18.	Problematic aspects related to voting by mobile ballot box	3
19.	Refusal to give the vote counting protocols or intimidating the observers while issuing the VCP	6
20.	Other	30
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>481</b>



## Annex 2. Other incidents

Other		
No of cases	Description	Number of PS
1	Limited accessibility of PSs	PS 1/2
1	Voters requesting pay to vote.	PS 37/13
3	Voters' inappropriate behaviour	PS 01/084, PS 01/115, PS 1/353
3	Information board placed inappropriately or missing in the PS	PS 01/087, PS 37/20, PS 37/21
4	Voting with inappropriate identity documents	PS 01/108, PS 01/150, PS 01/203, PS 1/383,
5	Contacting voters by phone to invite them to vote and/or ask about their participation in the election	Chişinău mun., PS 01/228, PS 8/34, PS 15/11
13	Failure of the electoral office of the PS to comply with the law (issuance of ballot papers, procedures on the election day)	PS 01/082, PS 01/092, PS 1/398, PS 6/21, PS 7/6, PS 10/4, PS 12/13, PS 18/002, PS 25/009, PS 32/21, PS 36/35, PS 37/1, PS 37/3
<b>Total 30 cases</b>		

### Annex 3. Description of categories of errors in protocols by polling stations

No	C/PS	Constituency/Settlement	No of errors	Error
1	02-051	Balti - BALTI	2	I == C+J J == I-C
2	06-018	Briceni - CORJEUTI	2	I == C+J J == I-C
3	09-024	Calarasi - MELESENI	1	H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
4	01-174	Chisinau - CIOCANA	2	I == C+J J == I-C
5	01-254	Chisinau - DURLESTI	1	H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
6	12-027	Criuleni - MAGDACESTI NORD	5	D == F+H I == C+J F == D-H J == I-C H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
7	19-005	Glodeni - GLODENI	2	I == C+J J == I-C
8	19-022	Glodeni - DANU	2	D == F+H F == D-H
9	19-028	Glodeni - IABLOANA	2	I == C+J J == I-C
10	20-057	Hincești - SARATA-GALBENA	1	H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
11	21-002	Ialoveni - IALOVENI	3	E == C-D I == C+J J == I-C
12	21-024	Ialoveni - MALCOCI	1	E == C-D
13	23-017	Nisporeni - BURSUC	2	I == C+J J == I-C
14	24-005	Ocnita - OTACI	1	H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
15	24-010	Ocnita - BIRLADENI	1	E == C-D
16	26-040	Rezina - TAREUCA	4	C >= D D == F+H E == C-D F == D-H
17	30-030	Straseni - NEGRESTI	2	I == C+J J == I-C
18	35-054	Ungheni - NEGURENII VECHI	3	D == F+H F == D-H H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
19	01-329	Russian Federation - Moscow region	1	E == C-D
20	01-340	French Republic - Paris	1	H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
21	01-378	Italian Republic - Vicenza	2	I == C+J J == I-C
22	01-334	Russian Federation - Lipetk	1	H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8
23	01-364	Italian Republic - Trento	5	D == F+H E == C-D I == C+J F == D-H J == I-C
24	01-370	Italian Republic - Modena	1	E == C-D
25	01-386	Italian Republic - Firenze	2	I == C+J J == I-C
26	01-392	Republic of Lithuania - Vilnius	2	D == F+H F == D-H
27	01-399	United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Glasgow	2	C <= A+B H == G1+G2+G3+G4+G5+G6+G7+G8